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IV, STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent/Appellee, Lynda Wood ("Lynda" or "Respondent") 
responds to an Appeal by Petitioner/Appellant, Neil R. Mitchell 
("Neil" or "Petitioner"), and cross-appeals from part of the 
Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, entered by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on June 30, 1995. Jurisdiction is proper 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1953 as amended). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. If a personal representative under a will fails 
to carry out the express terms of the will by neglecting to 
establish a trust, but follows the grantor's intent by disbursing 
money in accordance with the terms of the trust, is the personal 
representative, or her estate, liable to the residuary 
beneficiaries under the will? (Issue preserved at R. 435-440) . 
2. If a personal representative breaches her 
fiduciary duty to form a trust, but the residuary beneficiaries 
receive the same amount of money, so that no actual damages 
result, is the personal representative, or her estate, liable in 
any amount to the residuary beneficiaries? (Issue preserved at 
R. 445-447, 511-512) . 
3. Was the Trial Court correct in ruling that 
personal representative fees charged against the Grantor's estate 
were not cash deficiencies in the Grantor's estate, but were 
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reasonable allowances for the personal representative? (Issue 
preserved at R. 387, 511-512). 
4. Did the Trial Court correctly interpret language 
in the will entitling the beneficiary to proceeds from an estate 
"as is necessary" for her health, support and maintenance to mean 
the beneficiary need not deplete her own estate before accessing 
funds from the Grantor's estate? (Issue preserved at R. 435-437, 
511-512). 
5. Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the sole 
intestate heir and beneficiary of an estate was not entitled to 
the proceeds of a personal injury suit settled after the 
Grantor's death? (Issue preserved at R. 447-448, 512-513). 
Because the issues raised in this cross-appeal were 
summarily decided on Motions for Summary Judgement, they are 
questions of law. Accordingly, this Court should afford the 
Trial Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law no 
deference and should review them de novo for correctness. See 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Lynda Wood submits that the following authorities are 
controlling and entitle her to judgment as a matter of law: 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-201, 75-3-101, 75-3-711, 78-11-12, 
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RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 24(e) 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 
CASES 
The issues presented in this appeal are ones of first 
impression for this Court. Lynda Wood therefore submits that the 
following persuasive cases are determinative: 
First National Bank v. Finkbiner. 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 
1966) (trustee's instruction to invade principal of trust created 
by husband for wife "as may be necessary for her proper care and 
support" did not require the wife to exhaust her assets before 
payments could be made). 
Godfrey v. Chandler, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kan. 1991) (trustee's 
instruction to pay beneficiary so much as is necessary for his 
support and maintenance raises an inference that beneficiary 
receive support from the trust, regardless of other income). 
Estate of Lindaren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994) (trust 
created to provide for settlor's wife's necessary support, care 
and health was liable for wife's nursing home, burial and funeral 
expenses notwithstanding wife's personal assets). 
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The issue presented in this cross-appeal is one of first 
impression for this Court. Lynda Wood therefore further submits 
that the following persuasive case is determinative: 
Behm's Estate v. Gee. 213 P.2d 657 (Utah 1950) (wrongful 
death statute providing that action may be maintained by 
decedent's intestate heirs held that the proceeds from the 
wrongdoer should not be intermingled with the other assets of the 
deceased's estate). 
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VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a claim against the estate of Marjorie 
S. Sims, the former personal representative of her husband, G. 
Grant Sims7 estate, who acted according to the substance and 
intent of her husband's will, though not in strict accordance as 
to the form. Neil Mitchell, as Successor Personal Representative 
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims, filed a claim against the Estate 
of Marjorie S. Sims, a probate proceeding pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under 
Probate No. 933900278 ES. Marjorie was the Personal 
Representative of Grant's Estate under the terms of Grant's Last 
Will and Testament (attached as Addendum "C"). (A copy of 
Marge's Last Will and Testament is attached at Addendum "B"). 
Under the Will, Marjorie was to fund a generation 
skipping trust after probate and Neil was to serve with her as 
Co-Trustee. Marjorie was the only principal beneficiary of this 
Trust and was to receive, without condition, income from the 
Trust and so much of the principal as was necessary for her 
health, support and maintenance in the standard to which she had 
been accustomed during Grant's lifetime. Marjorie did not fund 
the Trust, but withdrew funds from Grant's Estate which she used 
for her health, support and maintenance, in accordance with the 
express terms of the Will and the Trust. Thus, Marjorie's 
withdrawals did no damage to the residuary value to be received 
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by the beneficiaries of Grant's Trust. 
Additionally, Marjorie accepted the proceeds from a 
$50,000.00 Certificate of Deposit totalling $52,875.40 with 
interest to satisfy a claim she had filed in Grant's Estate. 
After Marjorie7s death, her Personal Representative, Lynda Wood, 
admitted early in these proceedings that $48,100.00 of the funds 
rightly belonged to Grant's Estate and offered that amount to 
Neil. The difference between $52,875.40 and the offer of 
$48,100.00 was due to Marge's claim for $1913.02 in personal 
representative fees and $2,875.40 in interest on the CD, which 
the trustees were required to pay Marjorie. 
Finally, Marjorie also accepted a settlement in the 
amount of $12,445.86 from a personal injury suit involving Grant 
as she was his only surviving intestate heir. Marge had paid 
most of the medical bills Grant incurred as a result of the 
injury so her claim against his estate was justified. 
On May 8, 1993, Neil filed a claim against Marjorie's 
Estate in the amount of $149,509.26 for cash deficiency in 
Grant's Estate which Lynda Wood denied on or about August 18, 
1993. Neil then filed a Petition and First Amended Petition for 
Allowance of Claim, alleging that Marjorie breached her fiduciary 
duty under the Grant's Will and misappropriated his estate funds. 
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B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Neil moved the Trial Court for summary judgment on his 
claim against Marjorie's estate. Lynda then moved for summary 
judgment denying Neil's claim. After oral argument, the Trial 
Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting both Neil's and 
Lynda's Motions for Summary Judgment in part and denying both in 
part. (The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision is attached at 
Addendum "D"). 
Neil filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court on July 19, 
1995, appealing from the part of the Trial Court's Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment (the "Order" which is attached as 
Addendum "E") that denied part of Neil's Motion and granted part 
of Lynda's Motion. Lynda filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on these 
matters on July 31, 1995, appealing the part of the Trial Court's 
Order that denied part of Lynda's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
granted part of Neil's Motion. 
C. Disposition at the Trial Court 
By its own terms, the Trial Court's Order was deemed a 
final judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
54(c) . 
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VIII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
G. Grant Sims ("Grant") and his wife, Marjorie S. Sims 
("Marjorie" or "Marge") had been married for many years and had 
enjoyed a healthy and prosperous life together. R. 406-408. 
However, by July 22, 1991, when they executed identical wills, 
both Grant and Marge were in their early 80's, confined to their 
home by age and declining health, and were bedridden. R. 406-
409. Both relied on home nurses for much of their care. R. 
406-409. Still, they enjoyed a comfortable life. When they 
could not prepare their own meals, they had dinners delivered 
from expensive restaurants. R. 406-408. They contributed to 
various civic causes. R. 406-408. And they paid for nurses' 
assistance in their home. R. 406-408. 
Grant and Marge were of sufficient wealth at the time 
they executed their wills that they were concerned about 
incurring large Federal Estate taxes. R. 409-411. Grant hired 
an estate tax specialist, Brett Paulsen, Esq., to review his will 
to confirm that the trust provisions would reduce their taxes 
without minimizing Marge's financial stability. R. 409-411. 
Grant's Will named Marge as his Personal Representative 
and named Petitioner Neil R. Mitchell ("Neil" or "Petitioner"), 
Neil's mother Elena Mitchell, and Respondent Lynda Wood ("Lynda" 
or "Respondent") as remaindermen. R. 2 71-274. Further, Grant's 
Will contained provisions for Marge's care and for disbursing his 
estate. R. 270-279. Marge's original will contained identical 
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provisions. Appellant's Br. at 29. In addition, Grant's Will 
called for a testamentary trust, named "The George Grant Sims 
Estate Tax Bypass Trust" ("the Trust") and appointed Marge as co-
trustee along with Neil, who was not a lineal relative of 
Grant's, but was Marge's nephew. R. 7, 49, 271-77. On November 
14, 1991, Grant died, leaving his Last Will and Testament ("the 
Will"). R. 61, 117, 270. About one year after Grant's death, 
Marge signed the final accounting of his Estate and therein 
proposed to disburse the residue to Neil and the other 
remaindermen. R. 258-259. 
The Will's trust provisions provided that Marge was to 
fund the Trust with the residue of Grant's Estate after she paid 
his creditors. R. 258, 271-272. Marge and Neil were to serve as 
co-trustees in administering the Trust. R. 271-272. The trust 
provisions in the Will mandated that Marge was to get the income 
from the Trust without condition and that "the trustee shall also 
distribute as much of the principal as is necessary for her 
proper health, support, and maintenance and to maintain her in 
the standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] 
lifetime." R. 272. After Marge's death, the remaining Trustee 
was directed to make two specific gifts of $10,000.00 from the 
Trust to each of Grant's doctors, Donald E. Smith, MD, and Mark 
Muir, MD. R. 272. After all Marge's medical and living expenses 
had been paid from the income and principal of the Trust and the 
gifts made to Grant's doctors, the remaining Trust corpus, if 
9 
any, was to be distributed to the remaindermen. R. 272. 
During the time Marge served as Personal Representative 
for Grant's Estate, the Trust was not funded. R. 398, 511. 
Marge was over 82 years old, bedridden and confined to her home. 
R. 392, 406-408. She was in constant need of in-house nursing 
care due to her age and poor health. R. 392, 406-408. 
Though she did not form the Trust, Marge drew checks on 
Grant's Estate to pay for her living and medical expenses, as 
provided in the Trust ("Checking Account Payments"). R. 383, 
398, 511-512. Of the $96,642.55 which Marge withdrew from 
Grant's Estate for living expenses, $75,439.15 was used to cover 
Marge's extensive but reasonable nursing and medical expenses. 
R. 378, 383, 398. She had tried to find less costly medical 
care, but could not. R. 406-408. The reasonableness of these 
expenses was established by uncontested affidavit from Lynda, who 
spent extensive amounts of time assisting both Grant and Marge in 
their last years. R. 406-408. 
Additionally, Marge accepted a $12,445.86 settlement for 
a personal injury suit involving her deceased husband ("Personal 
Injury Settlement"). R. 400-402. While Grant was alive he 
incurred many medical bills as a result of the personal injury, 
though his financial records show he only paid $112.30 in medical 
bills. R. 461. Marge's accounting, however, shows that she paid 
$18,943.3 0 out of her own funds for medical expenses, many of 
which were designated for Grant be the accounting. R. 462. 
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Grant died before the suit was settled, so Marge, as Grant's wife 
and sole surviving intestate heir, accepted the settlement as 
reimbursement for paying his medical costs. R. 400-402, 460-462. 
Also, Marge withdrew $52,875.40 from Grant's Estate by 
means other than the estate checking account ("Cash Deficiency"). 
R. 353-355, 383-84, 387. Part of that amount, $48,100.00, was 
wrongfully taken from Grant's Estate. R. 377, 387, 411, 511-512. 
Of the remainder, Marge claimed $2875.40 as income to which she 
was entitled without condition under the terms of the Will and 
$1900.00 as reasonable Personal Representative fees ("Cash 
Deficiency Remainder"). R. 48, 158-159, 384. Originally, Marge 
claimed $1913.02 in personal representative fees, but later 
reduced the claim to $1900.00, favoring Grant's Estate $13.02. 
R. 48, 340, 384. Marge's Estate has offered to repay the balance 
of $48,100.00 from the beginning of this case and her estate has 
repeated this offer to Neil's attorney. R. 377-379, 385, 411. 
Each time, the offer was either ignored or refused. R. 411. In 
any event, Neil has at times in these proceedings, only asked the 
court for $48,100.00 in relief on the Cash Deficiency and has not 
stated why a larger amount is now in order. R. 415. 
On September 2, 1992, Marge revoked the will she had 
executed at the same time as Grant's Will and drafted a new will 
naming Lynda her Personal Representative, deleting Neil as a 
beneficiary, and naming new beneficiaries. Appellant Br., 
Addendum B. On February 27, 1993, the day after she signed 
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Grant's accounting, Marjorie died. R. 7, 17, 282. At that time, 
Lynda was appointed Marge's Personal Representative and Neil was 
appointed Successor Personal Representative of Grant's Estate and 
continues to function in that capacity. R. 14, 258. 
On or about May 8, 1993, Neil filed a claim against 
Marge's Estate for the Checking Account Payments, the Cash 
Deficiency and the Personal Injury Settlement, which Lynda 
denied, August 18, 1993. R. 17, 47, 161. Neil then filed a 
Petition and First Amended Petition for Allowance of a Claim in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and moved for summary judgment. R. 50, 207, 345. Lynda 
also moved for summary judgment, admitting liability for the Cash 
Deficiency of $48,100.00, but denying that Grant's Estate had 
been damaged by Marge's withdrawals for medical and living 
expenses and claiming that Marge had the right to the Personal 
Injury Settlement. R. 380-404. 
The trial court granted and denied both motions in part. 
R. 510-15, 520-22. As to the Checking Account Payments, the 
court concluded that Marge did not form the Trust. R. 511. But, 
the court noted, because she would have been entitled to these 
funds had the Trust been formed, and because she used the funds 
in accordance with the terms of the Trust, there was no damage to 
Grant's Estate under U.C.A. § 75-3-711, and that the breach was 
not actionable. R. 511-12. 
As to the Cash Deficiency, the trial court found that the 
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amount of $48,100.00 was undisputed by Lynda and awarded Neil 
that amount plus 10% interest, but made no finding on Neil's 
refusal to accept Lynda's prior offers. R. 511-12. The court 
did not award Neil the $2875.40 income or the $1900.00 Personal 
Representative fees, noting the amount was "outlined in the 
Memoranda filed by [Respondent's counsel] . . . and [had] not 
been challenged as being inappropriate by the petitioner". R. 
511. 
The trial court granted Neil's claim on the Settlement of 
the Personal Injury Claim. R. 512-513. The court explained that 
Marge's acceptance of the settlement was an illegal conversion, 
though the statute provides that heirs are entitled to the 
settlement of a personal injury claim when the claimant has died 
of causes unrelated to the personal injury. R. 512-513. 
Neil has appealed from the Trial Court's determination as 
to the Checking Account Payments and the Cash Deficiency 
Remainder and the related parts of the Order. R. 510, 523-524. 
Lynda cross-appeals from the Trial Court's determination 
on the matter of the Settlement of the Personal Injury Claim and 
the related parts of the Order. R. 510, 531-532. 
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IX. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For the following reasons, the Trial Court was correct in 
denying part of Neil's Motion for Summary Judgment on the matters 
of the Checking Account payments and the Cash Deficiency 
Remainder and incorrect on the matter of the Settlement of the 
Personal Injury Claim: 
1. The language of Grant's Will shows that Grant 
intended Marge to have full and unconditional use of his estate 
income and use of his estate principal for her health, support 
and maintenance without ever suggesting that Marge deplete her 
own funds before she was entitled to support. 
2. Though the Trust was not formed, it was 
uncontested in the affidavits filed in the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and counter affidavits that Marge's withdrawals for 
medical and living expenses were reasonable and necessary as the 
Will and the Trust required, so that no actual damages resulted 
to Grant's Estate. 
3. Grant used a generation skipping trust to help 
reduce their estate tax burden, not to preserve his estate for 
the residuary remaindermen at Marge's expense. 
4. The phrase "as is necessary", as used in Grant's 
Will, did not limit Marge's access to the principal of Grant's 
Trust by requiring that she first deplete all her own resources; 
rather, the language of Grant's Will gave Marge access to the 
principal for all necessary medical and living expenses. 
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5. Marjorie would also have been entitled to the 
funds in Grant's Estate as his sole intestate heir under the Utah 
Devolution statute. 
6. Neil and the other beneficiaries are not entitled 
to part of the funds which Marge received from estate income and 
personal representative fees which were uncontroverted at the 
motions for summary judgment. 
7. Marge was entitled to the settlement of her late 
husband's personal injury settlement as his wife and sole 
surviving intestate heir under U.C.A. § 78-11-12. 
8. As to the $48,100.00 which Marjorie received from 
Grant's Estate, the trial court erred in awarding interest 
thereon because immediately after Marjorie's death, Linda offered 
to return said amount. 
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X. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S APPEAL 
A. MARJORIE IS NOT LIABLE TO GRANT'S ESTATE FOR BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE MATTER OF THE CHECKING ACCOUNT PAYMENTS AS 
HER REASONABLE MEDICAL AND LIVING EXPENSES DID NO DAMAGE TO 
GRANT'S ESTATE 
Even though Marge did not fund the Trust as Grant's Will 
instructed, she disbursed $96,642.55 in Checking Account Payments 
from his Estate to pay for her reasonable and necessary living 
and medical expenses exactly as Grant intended. Grant commanded 
the Trustees to disburse to Marge the Trust income "without 
condition" and principal "as is necessary for [Marge's] health, 
support and maintenance". (See Grant's Will Art. V, at Addendum 
"C") (emphasis added). Since Marge used the principal as 
necessary for her health, support and maintenance, exactly as 
Grant's Will required, she did not damage Grant's Estate of the 
residuary beneficiaries of the trust. Under U.C.A. § 75-3-711, 
the statute upon which Neil relied below (R. 261, Mem. of P. & A. 
in Supp. of Pet'rs Mot. for Summ. J.)f a personal representative 
can only be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duty for 
"damage or loss resulting from the breach of his fiduciary duty." 
(emphasis added). Thus, the legislature of this state has 
answered Neil's policy argument. Marge's Estate should not be 
liable for the Checking Account Payments so long as they did not 
damage the estate or the residuary beneficiaries, and the trial 
court's ruling on this matter should be affirmed. 
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1. MARJORIES DISBURSEMENT OF THE CHECKING ACCOUNT 
PAYMENTS FROM GRANT'S ESTATE WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
GRANT'S INTENT AS EXPRESSED IN THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
LANGUAGE IN HIS WILL 
The plain language of Grant's Will shows that, above all 
else, Grant intended to provide for Marge's health, support and 
maintenance and to preserve the same high standard of living as 
they had enjoyed while he was alive. There is no language in the 
Will indicating that Grant only wanted his estate to benefit 
Marge after she depleted all her own resources or that Grant's 
Estate was to be preserved for the benefit of any residuary 
legatees at Marge's expenses. Further, Grant's Will plainly 
demonstrates his intent to provide for Marge while keeping estate 
taxes to a minimum. Accordingly, Marge's disbursements of funds 
from Grant's Estate for her living and medical expenses were in 
strict keeping with Grant's instructions and his intent. 
It is a well established rule of law that the clear and 
unambiguous language of the will as read in its entirety is the 
starting point of a will's interpretation. Estate of Custick. 
842 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1992). This Court has further 
established that the purpose for interpreting a will should be to 
determine the testator's intent. Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 
1215 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, this Court should first look to 
the plain language of Grant's Will to determine his intent, and 
then examine whether Marge acted in accordance with Grant's 
intent. 
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a. The Language of Grant's Will Expresses His 
Intention To Provide For All Mariorie's Living 
and Medical Expenses From His Estate Without 
Requiring That She Deplete Her Own Estate 
Grant clearly and unambiguously indicated in his Will his 
desire to provide for his wife to receive without condition the 
income from his estate and the principal for her necessary and 
reasonable living and medical expenses. However, there is no 
language in his will to suggest he intended Marge to deplete her 
own assets before accessing the principal from the trust. Such a 
restriction runs counter to the plain language of Grant's Will 
and to his obvious intentions. 
First, Grant's instructions to the Trustees to care for 
Marge were mandatory, leaving the Trustees no discretion. 
According to Grant's Will, "the Trustees shall distribute to 
[Marge] without any conditions, all of the income of [the trust] 
. . . [and] as much of the principal as is necessary for her 
proper health, support and maintenance and to maintain her in the 
standard of living that she enjoyed during my lifetime." 
(Grant's Will Art. V, at Addendum "C") (emphasis added). Grant 
used the word "shall '1 to require the Trustees to pay Marge all 
his estate income without condition and principal from his Estate 
for all her medical and living expenses. The word "shall" is the 
equivalent of a command. Herr v. Salt Lake County* 525 P.2d 72 8, 
729 (Utah 1974)("The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that 
of a command."); Webster's Third International Dictionary 2085 
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(1981); Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) . Thus the 
plain meaning of the language was that the Trustees were 
commanded to distribute this money to Marge. Contrary to Neil's 
arguments, under the plain language of the Grant's Will, the 
trustees had no discretion in disbursing the principal of Grant's 
Estate for Marge's medical and living expenses. 
The circumstances in 1991, when Grant and Marge executed 
their identical wills, suggested that their medical and living 
expenses would be high and could possibly deplete their 
individual estates. Both Grant and Marge were confined to their 
beds in their own home requiring the expenditure of substantial 
amounts of money for health care. They both had reason to 
believe the other would continue to incur large medical and home-
care expenses if one were to die. However, the language in their 
wills shows that they wanted to be cared for in their home as 
long as they had the financial means without any regard for 
residuary legatees. And if Grant's Will is to be read in its 
entirety, the language suggests that no expense was to be spared 
in caring for the Marge after his death. 
Furthermore, Grant and Marge were used to a high standard 
of living while they were healthy which continued when they were 
confined to their home, and which Grant wished Marge to maintain 
after his death. When they were healthy, they attended Utah Jazz 
basketball games regularly, traveled extensively and made large 
donations to civic organizations. When they were no longer able 
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to cook for themselves, they would order expensive meals 
delivered by the New Yorker and the Oyster Bar. Theirs was not a 
meager lifestyle. (R. 406-408, Wood Aff.). 
Though the plain language of Grant's Will commanded the 
Trustees to maintain Marge in the same high standard of living, 
her failing health made that difficult. Most of Marge's expenses 
after Grant's death were related to her medical care. In fact, 
of the $96,642.55 disbursed in Checking Account Payments, 
$75,439.15 were connected to Marge's medical and home nursing 
care. Lynda Wood stated in sworn affidavit that Marge sought the 
least expensive medical and home care that she could obtain.1 
She did not continue ordering extravagant meals and ceased her 
donations to charity. 
By the standard Neil suggests, however, this was not 
enough. Instead, Marge should have depleted all her own 
resources and exhausted her own estate before turning to the 
1
 The reasonableness of Marge's expenditures was uncontested 
by Neil in his Motion for Summary Judgment and must, therefore, be 
upheld by this Court. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
[by affidavit, . . .] an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
U.R.C.P., Rule 56 (e) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, this Court should also uphold the trial court 
as to the fact that Marge's medical and living expenses were 
reasonable. 
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principal of Grant's Estate. Such an extreme standard would have 
required Marge to liquidate her half interest equity in their 
marital house in which she lived to exhaust her own resources. 
In addition, Neil's interpretation would have required the 
Trustees to pay Grant's doctors $10,000.00 each, while Marge 
exhausted her own resources. The plain language of Grant's Will 
in its plain language shows no such intent. 
Second, nothing within the four corners of the will 
suggests that Marge was to deplete her own resources before 
accessing the principal from the Trust. Despite the plain 
language in the Will, Neil has suggested that Grant's instruction 
that the Trustees invade the principal "as is necessary" for 
Marge's health care and living expenses be interpreted to give 
her access to the principal only after she exhausted all her own 
resources. Neil claims "The fact that the Will instructed the 
co-trustees to provide for Marge's maintenance should her own 
resources become depleted, indicates Grant's intent to ensure his 
wife's basic welfare during the remainder of her life." 
(Appellant's Br. at 27)(emphasis added). The requirement of the 
depletion of Marge's assets is clearly not a "fact". It is not 
supported or even suggested by any language in the Will. Nor did 
Grant intend to provide for his wife's "basic welfare". Grant's 
language in his Will expressed his clear intent to maintain her 
in the manner and style of living to which they had been 
accustomed while he was alive. As the evidence indicates, this 
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exceeded "basic welfare." Neil's assessment of this "fact" is 
clearly erroneous, and it should not sway the Court's attention 
from the clear and unambiguous language of Grant's Will. 
As detailed below, the better reasoned case law opposes 
such an extrapolation. For the Trustees or this Court to make 
such a determination would be to read beyond the plain language 
of Grant's Will and would contravene the Testator's express 
intent as shown by the language in the Will. 
b. Case Law Supports a Reading Of Grant's Will 
to Benefit Mariorie Without Requiring Her To 
Deplete Her Own Estate 
Case law from several jurisdictions supports a plain 
reading of the language in Grant's Will to require the Trustees 
to invade the corpus of Grant's Trust for Marge's medical and 
living expenses without requiring her to exhaust her own assets.2 
The courts of this jurisdiction have not considered this matter 
2
 Neil has asked the Court to consider several old cases from 
Eastern jurisdictions in determining the meaning of the phrase "as 
is necessary". The cases, which date between 1889 and 1949, arrive 
at the interpretation that the phrase calls for the total depletion 
of the beneficiaries own resources before accessing the trust 
principal. 
Instead, the Court should consider the more recent cases as 
discussed in this section and cited below: Taylor v. Hutchinson, 
497 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) : Estate of Wells v. Sanford, 663 
S.W.2d 174 (Ark. 1984); Hamilton National Bank v. Childers, 211 
S.E.2d 723 (Ga. 1975); Neilsen v. Duyveionck, 263 N.E.2d 743 (111. 
App. Ct. 1968); Estate of Dodge v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 
1979); In re Coats Estate, 581 S.W.2d 392, 393-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1979); and see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 12 8, comment e 
(1957). 
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previously. Accordingly, in interpreting the requirement that 
the principal of Grant's bypass trust "shall" be invaded for 
Marge's necessary medical and living costs, this Court should 
consider the specific language and facts in this case and the 
persuasive cases cited herein. 
The Court should first look to a Wyoming case where a 
will with language similar to Grant's was under consideration. 
In that case, the testator authorized the invasion of the income 
and principal of the trust "as may be necessary for [grantor's 
wife's] proper care and support." First National Bank and Trust 
Company of Wyoming v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224, 226 (Wyo. 1966). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted, "It is also a well recognized 
rule that the provisions of a husband's will or of a trust 
created by him conferring benefits upon his wife are to be 
construed liberally in her behalf." Id. at 229. 
In deciding that there had been no violation of the 
remaindermen's rights or breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty, 
the Wyoming court considered several matters relevant in our 
case. First, the court pointed to the remaindermen's distant 
relation from the grantor. The court favored, as should this 
Court, the care and support of the wife over the enrichment of 
the collateral relatives. Second, the Wyoming court considered 
that the wife had been accustomed to a high standard of living 
and that the grantor would therefore have intended that his wife 
have any amount of money necessary to maintain the same 
23 
lifestyle. Grant's intent was the same. The court concluded 
that "the primary purpose was to assure that [the grantor's wife] 
would be supported in a proper manner without having to rely 
soley [sic] upon the income from the trust and the property he 
left her." Id. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Additionally, the Court should consider the relevant 
holding in the recent Kansas Supreme Court case Godfrey v. 
Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kansas 1991). In that case, Chandley's 
husband died leaving a trust for Chandley's benefit which was to 
provide her with principal "as may be necessary for her support, 
health and maintenance." Id. at 1250. Among the factors the 
Kansas court considered in interpreting the phrase "as may be 
necessary" was that the wife was incompetent and under nursing 
care. That court looked to a long line of cases supporting the 
rule that "where a settlor directs the trustee to pay the 
beneficiary so much as is necessary for support and maintenance, 
an inference arises that the settlor intended the beneficiary to 
receive support from the trust estate, regardless of other 
income." Id. at 1251. The obvious reason for the Kansas court's 
definition is that the use of the phrase "as is necessary" by the 
testator was not connected to the beneficiary's assets or ability 
to pay, but was only included to establish the amount of her 
reasonable medical and living expenses. 
The Kansas court held on this matter, "The testator 
obviously intended to provide maintenance for his wife for her 
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life. His provision is limited only by what is necessary. In 
other words, it cannot be used to provide non-essential items." 
Id. at 1253. 
Finally, this Court should consider a most recent case 
from Montana, Estate of Lindaren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994). 
The conservator of a testamentary trust beneficiary petitioned 
for an order requiring the trustee to pay the beneficiary's 
nursing home expenses and burial and funeral costs. The trustee 
pointed to the language of the trust limiting disbursement of 
principal as "necessary for her support, care and health during 
her lifetime," and argued this language required the beneficiary 
to show financial need. The Montana Supreme Court disagreed, 
stating 
We will not interpret the liberal Trust language by 
way of a limited reading of the word 'necessary', 
referred to by the [trial] court as 'need'. The 
Trust does not itself contain any limiting language. 
. . . The Trust does not provide for the 
expenditure of Beneficiary's estate before any 
payments are to be made from the Trust. We will not 
read into the Trust this limitation. 
Id. at 1282-83. 
This Court should follow these well reasoned cases and be 
equally restrained by the language of the Will and the Grantor's 
intent and should not extrapolate other meanings of the phrase 
"as is necessary". 
However, Neil would have the Court rely on one much older 
and distinguishable Colorado case, Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 
853 (Colo. 1950), to suggest Grant's will should be read to 
25 
benefit Marjorie only after her own estate had been completely 
exhausted. But, the facts of that case are so different that 
Dunklee should not be applied as persuasive in the present case. 
In Dunklee, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted a will 
in which "[i]nstead of directing the Trustee to pay the 
beneficiary a sum to cover such necessities, she merely 
'authorized7 him to provide him with the necessities of life 'as 
may be necessary7". Id. at 854. The Colorado court considered 
that the beneficiary had since remarried, was profiting over 
$7,000.00 per month from a thriving medical practice and was 
receiving income from property which he owned. Further, that 
court construed the word "authorized" used in the conveyance as 
being permissive only. Id. Thus, the court ruled that the 
trustee could withhold the trust principal. Clearly, the 
language of that will made the beneficiary's support merely 
permissible, not mandatory, and, since the beneficiary was well 
cared for beyond the basic necessities of life, the court 
concluded he did not need the estate's support. 
These are not the facts of our case. First, the language 
of Grant's will does not merely authorize the use of such funds, 
it makes the Trustees duty to support Marge mandatory. As 
discussed above, Grant gave the Trustees no discretion in 
providing Marge with the income and "as much of the principal as 
is necessary" for Marge to be as comfortable as she had been 
while Grant was alive. 
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Second, Marjorie was not working and earning income, 
profiting from real estate or relying on the income of a new 
spouse, nor did she have such future prospects. She was in fact 
over eighty years old, confined to her bed and in need of 
constant medical care due to her poor health. She used the money 
Grant bequeathed her for the very purpose he intended: to pay for 
her medical care and attempt to live the lifestyle to which she 
had been accustomed during Grant's life. 
Because of these significant differences between Dunklee 
and the case at hand, this Court should reject the Dunklee test. 
The Kansas court in Godfrey dismissed Dunklee on the language and 
circumstances "where the settlor manifests an intention that the 
trust property be applied to the beneficiary's support only if 
and to the extent the beneficiary is in actual need." Godfrey at 
1251. Clearly this is not our case. 
This reasoning in Finkbiner and Godfrey, in addition to 
the other modern cases cited above, support the conclusion that, 
reading Grant's Will as a whole, Marjorie's other resources were 
unrelated to her right to the trust principal. Accordingly, the 
Court should conclude that the plain meaning of "shall" in 
Grant's Will is a command to the Trustees to support Marjorie, 
and that the phrase "as is necessary" was used for an objective 
standard, or to show how much to pay her, rather than requiring 
Marge to deplete all her own resources before benefitting from 
the principal of Grant's Trust. The Court should look to the 
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plain language of Grant's Will which provided for all of Marge's 
expenses necessary for her health, support and maintenance in the 
standard of living to which she had been accustomed, 
c. The Language of Grant's Will Demonstrates 
That He Also Intended to Minimize Estate Taxes, 
But Not to Preserve the Estate For Residual 
Beneficiaries at Marjorie's Expense 
Grant's Will clearly and unambiguously shows that Grant 
commanded the trustees to provide for all his wife's living and 
medical expenses, allowing her to maintain the same standard of 
living they shared during Grant's lifetime. Such language 
expresses Grant's unmistakable intention in establishing the 
bypass trust to provide liberally for all his wife's needs. His 
Will also suggests that Grant intended to avoid, as much as 
legally possible, excessive taxation of either his or his wife's 
estate. However, Grant's Will makes perfectly clear that these 
intentions superseded any desire to preserve his Estate for 
residuary beneficiaries. Under these circumstances, the Court 
"should recognize the natural inclination and purpose of the 
testator to favor his wife over remote heirs who are not his 
lineal descendants." Purdue v. Roberts, 314 So. 2d 280, 283 
(Ala. 1975). 
First, after providing for Marge's medical and living 
expenses, Grant called for the bypass trust to minimize his and 
Marge's estate taxes. Much of his Will is dedicated to 
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consideration of tax consequences. For example, in Article VIII 
of his Will, Grant leaves instructions for funding the Trust and 
other financial plans with several references to Federal Estate 
Tax law, which shows that Grant was well aware of tax 
consequences and constructed his Will to avoid estate taxes for 
both him and his wife as much as possible. In addition, he hired 
an estate tax specialist, Brett Paulsen, Esq., to review the will 
and to confirm that the trust provisions would reduce their tax 
burden while maximizing Marge's access to Grant's funds. 
In fact, the consideration of estate tax reduction is a 
common reasoning behind generation skipping trusts. Thus, common 
reasoning and the language and intent behind Grant's Will show 
that his purpose behind the bypass trust was to avoid reduce 
taxes, not to limit Marge's access to his estate. 
Second, there is no language in Grant's Will to support 
the notion that Grant wanted to preserve his estate for the 
residuary beneficiaries at his wife's expense. On the contrary, 
paragraph three of Article VII of Grant's Will indicates the 
extent Grant intended to provide for the remaindermen. Grant 
directed that, if he became incompetent or otherwise incapable of 
caring for himself, Marjorie was to act as conservator of his 
estate and care for Grant at his home in which Marge had a half 
interest as long as "there are funds available" and "that 
whatever funds are necessary be spent for my support, care and 
maintenance without regard for conserving any portion of my 
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estate for subsequent beneficiaries thereof.11 (Grant's Will, 
Art. 7)(emphasis added). Marjorie's earlier will, executed 
simultaneously with Grant's, had the same clause, showing that 
both Grant and Marge intended above all else, to care for each 
other and to spare no expense in providing for the other in the 
manner to which they had been accustomed during their married 
life, regardless of whether that expenditure depleted the 
potential interest of the residuary. 
In fact, before the residuary beneficiaries, Grant 
desired his doctors to share in the estate and he made this point 
clear in his Will. Grant commanded that his two doctors were 
each to receive $10,000.00 from the Trust before the subsequent 
beneficiaries received any money; the remaindermen only had a 
possible interest in the amount that was left after Marjorie, his 
widow, met her own living and medical expenses and after both his 
doctors received their $10,000.00 gifts. Had Grant been so 
concerned about his wife's relatives benefitting from his estate, 
he would have made such specific gifts to Neil and his family. 
Instead, Grant's Will simply shows that he intended to 
benefit the residual legatees only the amount left in his Estate 
after the Trustee's provided for Marge's medical and living 
expenses and made the gifts to Grant's doctors. 
Grant's primary intent in forming the bypass trust was to 
avoid taxes on the second generation distribution of his estate, 
which may have reduced substantially the amount received by the 
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remaindermen in addition to Marge's living expenses. The total 
amount received by Neil and the other remaindermen was dependant 
on how long Marjorie lived and the costs of her medical and 
living expenses. Had Marjorie outlived the assets in the trust, 
the remaindermen would have received nothing. As long as the 
residual left from these expenditures goes to the remainder 
legatees, they have no loss or damage. See Matter of Winston, 
425 N.E.2d 973 (111. App. Ct. 1981). 
If Marge had funded the Trust as set forth in Grant's 
Will, Neil would have been her co-trustee and, by his own 
statements and positions in this case, Marge, an 80 year-old 
bedridden person, would have had to fight him for every dime she 
withdrew for her living and medical expenses, benefitting Neil 
and the other residuary. (See Appellant Br. at 17-18). This 
clearly would have been contrary to Grant's intent in providing 
for his 80 year old wife. His desire to care for his wife and 
reduce estate taxes should not be ignored; they were the main 
purposes of the Trust. 
Reading Grant's Will as a whole, Neil has no basis for 
claiming that Grant wished to preserve his Estate for his 
unrelated residual legatees at his wife's expense. Instead, as 
the plain language of his Will shows, Grant's main intention in 
calling for a bypass trust was to benefit his wife as much as 
possible while minimizing their estate taxes. 
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d. Petitioner's Claim That He, As Co-Trustee to 
Grant's Estate Would Have Denied Marjorie's 
Claims For Living and Medical Expenses Is 
Speculative and Irrelevant to This Case 
Neil claims the trial court's conclusion that Marge was 
entitled to the support of Grant's Estate was speculative, that 
he "has taken exception to each of Marge's expenditures from the 
Estate", and that he would probably have withheld the funds from 
Marge. (Appellant Br. at 17-19). Neil has no basis for making 
these claims. He offers no citation to the record to support his 
statement as required by Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Nor does he address Lynda's affidavit supporting her 
Motion for Summary Judgment wherein she states the necessity and 
reasonableness of Marge's medical and living expenses. Neither 
does he cite any counter affidavit filed by him or any other 
person to dispute Lynda's affidavit. He also ignores the 
mandatory nature of Grant's devise, failing to address the 
meaning of the term "shall" and comparing this case to others 
which allowed the trustees to rely on their own discretion. 
Instead, Neil speculates what he might have done as Co-Trustee of 
Grant's Estate, evidence of which was not before the trial court 
and thus cannot be considered here. 
The trial court's ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment required no speculation. Instead, the court arrived at 
its conclusion by looking at the clear and unambiguous language 
of the will and the uncontested affidavits. The trial court 
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found the funds Marge took from Grant's Estate were funds "that 
she would have been entitled to receive had she funded the 
trust," (R. 511 Mem. Decision at 2). The court based this 
finding upon the fact that Neil had not filed an affidavit 
opposing Lynda's affidavit attesting to the reasonableness of 
Marge's expenditures.3 
The trial court did not find that Neil would have 
cooperated in allocating those funds. But, the question was not 
whether Neil would have honored his role as Trustee by disbursing 
the income and principal from the Trust for Marge's living and 
medical expenses. The question was whether Marge was entitled to 
the disbursements. Clearly, if the Trust had been funded she 
would have been so entitled. If Neil had denied Marge's claims, 
his actions would have prompted another suit for breach of 
fiduciary duty. As it is, the court engaged in no improper 
speculation in arriving at a decision found in the plain language 
of Grant's Will and supported by unopposed affidavit. But any 
claim by Neil as to how he would hypothetically have acted as Co-
Trustee is improper speculation beyond the scope of this 
proceeding and should not be considered by this Court. 
Again, pursuant to Rule 56(e) , it is not enough for Neil to 
address this matter in a pleading or affidavit. Since he has not 
filed any affidavits opposing Lynda's affidavit, her statements as 
to the reasonableness of Marge's expenses therein must be admitted. 
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2. MARGE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED AS GRANT'S LEGAL SPOUSE TO THE 
ASSETS OF HER HUSBAND'S ESTATE UNDER THE UTAH DEVOLUTION STATUTE 
While the trial court never reached the issue, another 
reason to uphold the decision below is that Utah statutory law 
entitles Marge to the money from Grant's Estate through 
devolution, as she was the sole beneficiary and thus entitled to 
the assets from the trust created by Grant's Will. Under the 
terms of U.C.A. § 75-3-101, which provides in part, "Upon the 
death of a person his real and personal property devolves to 
persons to whom it is devised by his last will . . . .", title to 
the money required for her living expenses devolved to Marjorie 
upon Grant's death. See People v. McCormick. 784 P.2d 808 (Colo. 
App. 19 89). Under the language of the Will, Marjorie was the 
person ultimately entitled to the income from the estate and in 
addition to so much of the principal for her living and medical 
expenses under U.C.A. § 75-3-101. 
Marge's use of the money for the purposes expressed in 
Grant's Will would have been in accordance with the statute. 
While the trial court did not address the issue, it was raised in 
the court below and is an additional reason why the residuary 
beneficiaries have not been damaged by Marge's withdrawals from 
Grant's Estate. 
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3, BECAUSE MARJORIE USED THE CHECKING ACCOUNT PAYMENTS 
FROM GRANT'S ESTATE FOR THE PURPOSES INDICATED IN GRANT'S 
WILL, SHE CAUSED NO ACTUAL DAMAGE TO GRANT'S ESTATE SO 
THAT NEIL'S CLAIM AS TO THAT AMOUNT IS NOT ACTIONABLE 
There was no actual damage to Grant's Estate since Marge 
used the funds according to the express intent of Grant's Will. 
Neil's claim was based on U.C.A. § 75-3-711 which holds a 
personal representative liable for "damage or loss resulting from 
the breach of fiduciary duty." Since there was no actual damage 
to the residual beneficiaries as provided in the motions, the 
trial court correctly found that Neil's claim for the Checking 
Account Payments was not actionable. 
Further, Marjorie's Estate would have the right to an 
offset for these amounts. Linda claimed below that if the trial 
court ruled that the money had to be paid back to Grant's Estate, 
such an order may have spawned further needless litigation 
between Marjorie's and Grant's Estates over the issues raised in 
this case: that is, whether or not the Trustees' duty to provide 
for Marge's medical and living expenses was mandatory or 
discretionary, whether her expenses were reasonable, and whether 
they were necessary. (R. 402, Mem. in Resp. to Pet'rs Mot. for 
Summ. J. at 21) 
If this Court were to adjudicate that Marjorie's Estate 
is liable to Grant's Estate for her living and medical expenses, 
income of Grant's Estate, or any other monies, such a judgment 
would give rise to a claim by Marjorie's estate for the return of 
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the same monies, i.e. the income from Grant's Estate and the sum 
of $96,642.55, as living and medical expenses to which she was 
clearly entitled under the terms of Grant's Will. 
As the trial court correctly found, there was no ultimate 
damage to Grant's Estate or to his residuary legatees, and there 
can be no liability found in Marge or her Estate for the Checking 
Account Payments related to her reasonable and necessary medical 
and living expenses. (R. 511-512). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO AN ESTATE CASH DEFICIENCY IN THE AMOUNT OF 
352,875.40, BUT ONLY IN THE AMOUNT OF $48,100.00 
The trial court was correct to conclude that Neil was not 
entitled to the difference between $52,875.40 which Marge took 
from Grant's Estate and $48,100,00 which the court deemed a 
conversion and ordered repaid to Grant's Estate ("Cash Deficiency 
Remainder") (R. 510-511). The trial court was justified in its 
decision for two reasons: the Cash Deficiency Remainder legally 
belonged to Marge and Neil did not dispute the accounting. 
First, the Cash Deficiency Remainder rightfully belonged 
to Marge. Marge deposited into her own account a Certificate of 
Deposit in Grant's name, valued at $50,000.00 plus interest in 
the amount of $2 875.40, as a claim in Grant's Estate. Lynda 
acknowledged after Marge's death that the deposit was in error 
and has offered to repay that amount to Grant's Estate. (R. 3 84, 
Resp'ts Mot. for Summ. J. at 3). However, Neil, as Successor 
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Personal Representative, and his counsel, have repeatedly refused 
this offer. (R. 411, McCoy Aff. para 9). 
Grant Thornton, who made the accounting of Grant and 
Marge's estates found a shortage of interest income from Grant's 
Estate of $2,875.40. (R. 340, 352, Livingston Aff. at 3). This 
interest from the CD, had it been deposited in Grant's account, 
would have belonged to Marge by the terms of Grant's Will. 
Accordingly, Marge was entitled to the $2,875.40 in interest. 
Additionally, Marge, in her accounting, made a claim for 
$1913.05 as a personal representative's fee against Grant's 
Estate. Neil never contested the claim, so the court was correct 
to accept it as a reasonable personal representative fee and not 
award this amount to Neil. (R. 511-512). 
Second, the trial court was correct to not award the Cash 
Deficiency Remainder to Neil because the amount had been 
accounted for in affidavits attached to Lynda's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the proceedings below. Neil failed to 
contest the accounting, offering no affidavits, depositions or 
evidence of any kind contradicting the accounting, so pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), the matter was properly 
decided in Respondent's favor. (Supra at 22, fn.l). 
As Neil failed to submit any affidavit contesting the 
Cash Deficiency Remainder, the trial court correctly entered the 
finding against him. Thus, for these two reasons, Neil has no 
valid claim to the Cash Deficiency Remainder. 
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C. NEIL HAS RAISED A CLAIM OF ESTOPPEL FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL WHICH THE COURT MUST REJECT AS IT IS RAISED IN VIOLATION 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. IT IS BASELESS AND IT IS UNSUPPORTED 
Neil has raised a claim of estoppel on appeal which he 
did not raise in the proceedings below. He has asserted that 
"Marge did not do equity in this case . . . [so] Ms. Wood should 
accordingly be estopped from claiming Marge's estate has no 
liability to Grant's estate." (Appellant's Br. at 39). This 
Court has cited the well established principal that legal issues 
not presented to the trial court cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Ong International Inc. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Avenue 
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n. 31 (Utah 1993) ("Failure to raise 
the point [below] precludes its consideration here."). Neil has 
not offered any explanation as to why he did not raise this 
argument below. Accordingly, this matter of estoppel which Neil 
raises here for the first time cannot be considered by the Court. 
In addition, the Court should reject Neil's claim of 
estoppel because it runs contrary to the equitable notion that a 
party may raise defenses to a claim brought against it. For Neil 
to assert that Marge's Estate can in no way defend the charges 
against it is unfounded. Neil cites no cases supporting his 
charge. The one case he does cite, Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah 
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990), is not 
a probate case and is in no way relevant to the case at hand. 
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Nor does Neil try to address the distinction which the 
court below made between Marge's breach of fiduciary duty and the 
lack of liability due to an absence of damages. The fact is, 
though the trial court found that Marge had breached her 
fiduciary duty, it also found that the claim was not actionable 
because no damage was proven. The two matters are distinct. 
Inasmuch as Neil has not addressed this distinction, nor offered 
any evidence or case law supporting his claim, and inasmuch as he 
has raised this matter for the first time on appeal, the Court 
should reject Neil's claim that Lynda be estopped from defending 
against liability. 
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XI, ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS CROSS-APPEAL 
A. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, MARGE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HER LATE HUSBAND'S 
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT 
The trial court erred in ruling that Marge was not 
entitled by statutory law to the settlement of Grant's personal 
injury suit. As Grant's only surviving intestate heir, Marjorie 
was entitled to the $12,445.86 settlement of a personal injury 
case on Grant's behalf, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-11-12 subsection 
(b). This statute provides that if a person having a personal 
injury claim dies of causes unrelated to the personal injury, the 
heirs would collect all "out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on 
behalf of that injured person as a result of his injury." U.C.A. 
§ 75-1-201 defines "heirs", as used in U.C.A. 78-11-12, as "those 
persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under 
the statute of intestate succession to the property of a 
decedent." Since Marge had paid for most of Grant's medical 
expenses incurred through his personal injury, she was entitled 
to a reimbursement of that sum by Grant's Estate. 
Grant had incurred large medical expenses as a result of 
his personal injury. However, the final accounting of Grant's 
Estate showed that he only paid $112.30 in medical bills, making 
it apparent that his estate never bore the expenses. Marge's 
Estate, on the other hand, expended $18,943.30 from 1990 - 1991 
on medical bills, designated by the accounting as incurred by 
either Grant or "Both", that is, between Marge and Grant. 
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Marge's Estate clearly bore the greater loss from the medical 
expenses incurred as a result of Grant's personal injury. 
Marjorie was legally the surviving spouse of Grant and 
his only surviving intestate heir and as such was entitled to the 
amount incurred by Grant as a result of the personal injury. The 
remaindermen, whom Petitioner represents, a sister, nephew and 
niece of Marjorie only, with no blood relationship to Grant, did 
not have standing as intestate heirs to claim any of this 
settlement. See Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980); 
and In re Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657 (Utah 1950); and Parmley v. 
Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557 (Utah 1924). In Behm's 
Estate, this Court held that proceeds collected on behalf of the 
decedent from the wrong-doer in a tort action should not be 
intermingled with other assets of the decedent's estate so as to 
subject the claim to the costs and expenses of estate 
administration, but should be distributed directly to the 
intestate heirs. This Court stated 
Generally speaking, there are two methods used by 
courts when involving such a distribution. The 
first is in accordance with the particular statute 
on descent and distribution for probate proceedings. 
The second is by proportional method, the probate 
being determined by the loss of each heir. We adopt 
the later method. . . . For many years, this court 
has confirmed the principal that the statutory 
beneficiaries take separate and apart from the 
estate. The funds may pass through the hands of the 
personal representative but the cause of action is a 
new cause which runs directly through the heirs. 
Id. at 660. 
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In this case, it was Marjorie who suffered through the 
problems which the injuries inflicted on her husband, and, upon 
Grant's death, suffered the immediate loss of her husband and 
companion, not the remaindermen who were not even Grant's blood 
relatives. The statute is phrased in the disjunctive that the 
money be disbursed to the decedent's heirs or his personal 
representative. The statute does not require that the money be 
paid to Grant's personal representative. The only case law in 
Utah on the subject, Behm's Estate, interpreting this type of 
statute, held that the heirs who suffered the loss receive their 
recovery in proportion to their loss without the funds being 
intermingled with the rest of the estate. 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision that Marjorie 
should have deposited the check for $12,445.86 into Grant's 
Estate for distribution to persons other than herself as 
surviving spouse is incorrect. This Court should adhere to its 
decision in Behm's Estate and reverse the trial court, and should 
not award Neil any portion of the $12,445.86. 
B. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST ON THE CASH DEFICIENCY 
OF 348,100.00 AS THAT AMOUNT HAD BEEN OFFERED TO NEIL AND HIS 
ATTORNEYS AND REFUSED 
Cross-appellant, Lynda Wood, offered to Neil the sum of 
$48,100.00 shortly after Marjorie7s death and also offered the 
same amount to Neil's attorneys subsequently throughout. Lynda's 
offer has never been accepted by Neil. (R. 411, McCoy Aff. at 
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2). According to this Court's principal that rules regarding 
damages on conversion "can be modified in the interest of 
fairness," Winters v. Charles Anthony Jewelers, 586 P.2d 453, 454 
(Utah 1978), this Court should eliminate the award of interest on 
this amount. 
Further a tender of the converted property prior to the 
commencement of the action will reduce the damages of a claimant. 
Colby v. Reed, 99 U.S. 560, 25 L.Ed. 484 (1879). These matters 
were argued to the trial court in final argument. (R. 5 63). 
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded interest at 10% per anum on 
said amount. The Cross-appellant takes the position that the 
imposition of interest on that money was error where the cross-
appellant offered to return it prior to the claim being made. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 8c RELIEF REQUESTED 
Lynda Wood respectfully requests that this Court find in 
her favor and affirm the Trial Court's Order as to the Checking 
Account Payments and the Cash Deficiency Remainder and reverse 
the Trial Court's Order as to the Personal Injury Settlement by 
granting Lynda judgment as a matter of law on the amount of 
$12,445*86 with interest per the Order and to delete the interest 
on the Cash Deficiency. 
DATED this day of November/7 1995 
Tohn L. McCoy 
Attorney for Appellee, 
Lynda Wood 
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ADDENDA 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-201, 75-3-101, 75-3-711, 
75-3-909; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; 
Operation of the Courts, Rule 4-501 
Last Will and Testament of Marjorie S. Sims 
Last Will and Testament of G. Grant Sims 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
Trial Court's Order of Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
Determinative Case Law 
ADDENDUM "A" 
153 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
fault judgment where notice is required only Default judgments against the United States 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does nvi. so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered agams: him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
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and substituted "the value" for "a ratio of bond ciaT for "qualifications of in the rule heading, 
dollars to letter of credit dollars" in the second inserted "re-qualification and disqualification" 
sentence; in present Subdivision (5), substi- and "commercial" in the Intent section, and 
tuted "current assets" for "real assets" in two substantially rewrote the rule. 
places; and rewrote present Subdivision (6) to The 1993 amendment in Subdivision (6) 
delete a table setting out the ratio of bond dol- added the designation (A), deleted "the lesser 
lars outstanding to net worth value. of $500,000 or" after "exceed" in Subdivision 
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer- (A), and added Subdivision (B). 
Rule 4*408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
nated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar 
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any 
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this 
rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either partv may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. TI^ implication shaxi be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
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of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Subdivision (l)(b) and made related stylistic 
ment deleted "and a copy of the proposed or- changes and inserted "principal" in Subdivi-
der" following "supporting documentation" in sion (3)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
against the award of attorney fees, it erred in 
entering its decision before the time allowed 
under this rule to file a reply memorandum 
had expired and in not reconsidering its deci-
sion by reviewing plaintiffs' reply memoran-
dum and revised affidavits. American Vending 
Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 242 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State 
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 .Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 
Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery documents. 
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 days of trial. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1; Parties conducting discovery ur.der Rules 33. 34 and 36 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the 
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the clerk of 
the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a 
copy of the proof of service afiixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery 
request and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party 
responding to the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the 
proof of service afiixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses and the proof of 
service upon the opposing party or counsel. The discovery requests and re-
ANALTSIS 
When rule applies. 
Cited. 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff 
should have been given ten days to respond, as 
prescribed by Subdivision (l)(b) of this rule. 
Gillmor v. Curr.mingB, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Even though the trial court had considered 
both parties' motions and memoranda for and 
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(a) to inspect and monitor property held by the fidu-
ciary, including interests in sole proprietorships, partner-
ships, or corporations and any assets owned by any such 
business enterprise, for the purpose of determining com-
pliance with environmental law affecting the property 
and to respond to any actual or threatened violation of 
any environmental law affecting the property held by the 
fiduciary; 
(b) to take, on behalf of the estate or trust, any action 
necessary to prevent, abate, or otherwise remedy any 
actual or threatened violation of any environmental law 
affecting property held by the fiduciary, either before or 
after the initiation of an enforcement action by any 
governmental body; 
(c) to refuse to accept property if the fiduciary deter-
mines that any property to be donated to the trust or 
estate either is contaminated by any hazardous substance 
or is being used or has been used for any activity directly 
or indirectly involving hazardous substance which could 
result in liability to the trust or estate or otherwise impair 
the value of the assets held in the trust or estate; 
(d) to settle or compromise at any time any and all 
claims against the trust or estate which may be asserted 
by any governmental body or private party involving the 
alleged violation of any environmental law affecting prop-
erty held in trust or in an estate; 
(e) to disclaim any'power granted by any document, 
statute, or rule of law which, in the sole discretion of the 
fiduciary, may cause the fiduciary to incur personal liabil-
ity under any environmental law; or 
(f) to decline to serve as a fiduciary if the fiduciary 
reasonably believes that there is or may be a conflict of 
interest between it in its fiduciary capacity and in its 
individual capacity because of potential claims or liabili-
ties which may be asserted against it on behalf of the 
trust or estate because of the type or condition of assets 
held in the trust or estate. 
(2) For purposes of this section "environmental law" means 
iny federal, state, or local law, rule, regulation or ordinance 
•elating to protection of the environment or human health. 
?or purposes of this section, "hazardous substances" means 
my substance defined as hazardous or toxic or which is 
otherwise regulated by any environmental law. 
(3) The fiduciary is entitled to charge the cost of any 
inspection, review, abatement, response, cleanup, or remedial 
action authorized in this section against the income or prin-
cipal of the trust or estate. A fiduciary shall not be personally 
liable to any beneficiary or other party for any decrease in 
value of assets in trust or in an estate by reason of the 
fiduciary's compliance with any environmental law, specifi-
cally including any reporting requirement under the law. 
Neither the acceptance by the fiduciary of property or a failure 
by the fiduciary to inspect property shall be considered to 
create any inference as to whether or not there is or may be 
any liability under any environmental law with respect to the 
property. 
(4) This section applies to all estates and trusts in existence 
upon and created after July 1, 1991. 
(5) No exercise by a fiduciary of any of the powers granted 
in this section shall constitute a transaction which is affected 
by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary. 
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PART 2 
DEFINITIONS 
75-1-201. General definitions. 
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subse-
quent chapters which are applicable to specific chapters or 
parts, as used in this code: 
(1) "Application" means a written request to the regis-
trar for an order of informal probate or appointment 
under Chapter 3, Part 3. 
(2) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, 
includes a person who has any present or future interest, 
vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of an 
interest by assignment or other transfer and as it relates 
to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to 
enforce the trust. 
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a 
child under this code by intestate succession from the 
parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any 
person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, 
or any more remote descendant. 
(4) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and 
protected persons, includes liabilities of the decedent or 
protected person whether arising in contract, in tort, or 
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or 
after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of 
a conservator, including funeral expenses. The term does 
not include estate or inheritance taxes, Utah income 
taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a dece-
dent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be 
included in the estate. 
(5) "Court" means any of the district courts of the state 
of Utah. 
(6) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by 
a court to manage the estate of a protected person. 
(7) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamen-
tary disposition of real or personal property and when 
used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal 
property by will. 
(8) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to 
receive a devise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust 
or trustee, or to a trustee or trust described by will, the 
trust or trustee is the devisee, and the beneficiaries are 
not devisees. 
(9) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as 
described by Section 75-5-401. 
(10) "Distributee" means any person who has received 
property of a decedent from his personal representative 
other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary 
trustee is a distributee only to the extent of distributed 
assets or increment thereto remaining in the trustee's 
hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the 
trustee has distributed property received from a personal 
representative is a distributee of the personal represen-
tative. For purposes of this subsection, testamentary 
trustee includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred 
by will to the extent of the devised assets. 
(11) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, 
trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to this 
code as originally constituted and as it exists from time to 
time during administration. 
(12) "Exempt property" means that property of a dece-
dent's estate which is described in Section 75-2-402. 
(13) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, 
guardian, conservator, and trustee. 
(14) "Foreign personal representative" means a per-
sonal representative of another jurisdiction. 
(15) "Formal proceedings" means those conducted be-
fore a judge with notice to interested persons. 
(16) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a 
guardian of a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to 
testamentary or court appointment but excludes one who 
is merely a guardian ad litem. 
(17) "Heirs" means those persons, including the surviv-
ing spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intes-
tate succession to the property of a decedent. 
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ion 
-808. Individual liability of personal representative. 
-809. Secured claims. 
-810. Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated 
claims. 
-811. Counterclaims. 
-812. Execution and levies prohibited. 
-813. Compromise of claims. 
-814. Encumbered assets. 
-815. Administration in more than one state — Duty 
of personal representative. 
-816. Final distribution to domiciliary representa-
tive. 
Part 9 
Special Provisions Relating to 
Distribution 
•901. Successors' rights if no administration. 
•902. Distribution — Order in which assets appro-
priated — Abatement. 
•903. Right of retainer. 
•904. Interest on general pecuniary devise. 
•905. Penalty clause for contest. 
•906. Distribution in kind — Valuation — Method. 
•907. Distribution in kind — Evidence. 
908. Distribution — Right or title of distributee. 
909. Improper distribution — Liability of distribu-
tee. 
910. Purchasers from distributees protected. 
911. Partition for purpose of distribution. 
912. Private agreements among successors to dece-
dent binding on personal representative. 
913. Distributions to trustee. 
914. Disposition of unclaimed assets. 
915. Distribution to person under disability. 
916. Apportionment of estate taxes. 
Part 10 
Closing Estates 
1001. Formal proceedings terminating administra-
tion — Testate or intestate — Order of gen-
eral protection. 
1002. Formal proceedings terminating testate ad-
ministration — Order construing will with-
out adjudicating testacy. 
L003. Closing estates — By sworn statement of per-
sonal representative — Waiver of account-
ings. 
L004. Liability of distributees to claimants. 
L005. Limitations on proceedings against personal 
representative. 
L006. Limitations on actions and proceedings 
against distributees. 
L007. Certificate discharging liens securing fiduciary 
performance. 
.008. Subsequent administration. 
Part 11 
Compromise of Controversies 
101. Effect of approval of agreements involving 
trusts, inalienable interests, or interests of 
third persons. 
102. Procedure for securing court approval of com-
promise. 
Part 12 
Collection of Personal Property by 
Affidavit and Summary Admin-
istration Procedure 
for Small Estates 
Section 
75-3-1201. 
75-3-1202. 
75-3-1203. 
75-3-1204. 
Collection of personal property by affidavit. 
Effect of affidavit. 
Small estates — Summary administrative pro-
cedure. 
Small estates — Closing by sworn statement of 
personal representative. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
75-3-101. Devolution of estate at death — Restrictions. 
The power of a person to leave property by will and the 
rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are 
subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this 
code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon the 
death of a person his real and personal property devolves to 
persons to whom it is devised by his last will or to those 
indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving lapse, 
renunciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolution 
of testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, 
to his heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for them in 
cases involving renunciation or other circumstances affecting 
devolution of intestate estates, subject to homestead allow-
ance, exempt property and family allowance, rights of credi-
tors, elective share of the surviving spouse, and administra-
tion. 1975 
75-3-102. Necessity of order of probate for will. 
Except as provided in Section 75-3-1201, to be effective to 
prove the transfer of any property or to nominate a personal 
representative, a will must be declared to be valid by an order 
of informal probate by the registrar, or an adjudication of 
probate by the court, except that a duly executed and unre-
voked will which has not been probated may be admitted as 
evidence of a devise if both: 
(1) no court proceeding concerning the succession or 
administration of the estate has occurred; and 
(2) either the devisee or the devisee's successors and 
assigns possessed the property devised in accordance with 
the provisions of the will, or the property devised was not 
possessed or claimed by anyone by virtue of the decedent's 
title during the time period for testacy proceedings. 1988 
75-3-103. Necessity of appointment for administration. 
Except as otherwise provided in Title 75, Chapter 4, to 
acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of 
a personal representative of a decedent, a person must be 
appointed by order of the court or registrar, qualify and be 
issued letters. Administration of an estate is commenced by 
the issuance of letters. 1975 
75-3-104. Claims against decedent — Necessity of ad-
ministration. 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a 
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced 
before the appointment of a personal representative. After the 
appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and ac-
tions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the 
procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After distribution a 
creditor whose claim has not been barred may recover from 
the distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a 
former personal representative individually liable as provided 
75-3-707 UJNl^UKM rtiVDAirj VUUUEJ J.O«* 
75-3-707. Duty of personal representative — Supple-
mentary inventory. 
If any property not included in the original inventory comes 
to the knowledge of a personal representative or if the per-
sonal representative learns that the value or description 
indicated in the original inventory for any item is erroneous or 
misleading, he shall make a supplementary inventory or 
appraisement showing the market value as of the date of the 
decedent's death of the new item or the revised market value 
or descriptions, and the appraisers or other data relied upon, 
if any, and file it with the court if the original inventory was 
filed, or furnish copies thereof or information thereof to 
persons interested in the new information. 1975 
75-3-708. Duty of personal representat ive — Posses-
s ion of estate . 
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every 
personal representative has a right to, and shall take posses-
sion or control of, the decedent's property, except that any real 
property or tangible personal property may be left with or 
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto 
unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representa-
tive, possession of the property by him will be necessary for 
purposes of administration. The request by a personal repre-
sentative for delivery of any property possessed by an heir or 
devisee is conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir 
or devisee for possession thereof, that the possession of the 
property by the personal representative is necessary for pur-
poses of administration. The personal representative shall pay 
taxes on, and take all steps reasonably necessary for the 
management, protection, and preservation of, the estate in his 
possession. He may maintain an action to recover possession 
of property or to determine the title thereto. 1975 
75-3-709. P o w e r to avoid transfers. 
The property liable for the payment of unsecured debts of a 
decedent includes all property transferred by him by any 
means which is in law void or voidable as against his creditors, 
and subject to prior liens, the right to recover this property, so 
far as necessary for the payment of unsecured debts of the 
decedent, is exclusively in the personal representative. The 
personal representative is not required to institute such an 
action unless requested by creditors who must pay or secure 
the cost and expenses of litigation. 1975 
75-3-710. Powers of personal representat ives — In 
general . 
Until termination of his appointment a personal represen-
tative has the same power over the title to property of the 
estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust, however, 
for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the 
estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, 
or order of court, unless otherwise specifically provided by this 
COde. 1983 
75-3-711. Improper exercise of power — Breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, 
the personal representative is liable to interested persons for 
damage or loss resulting from breach of his fiduciary duty to 
the same extent as a trustee of an express trust. The rights of 
purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative 
shall be determined as provided in Sections 75-3-712 and 
75-3-713. 1975 
75-3-712. Sale, encumbrance or transaction involving 
conflict of interest — Voidable — Exceptions. 
Any sale or encumbrance to the personal representative, his 
spouse, agent, or attorney, or any corporation or trust in which 
he has a substantial beneficial interest, or any transaction 
which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the 
part of the personal representative, is voidable by any person 
interested in the estate, except one who has consented after 
fair disclosure, unless: 
(1) The will or a contract entered into by the decedent 
expressly authorized the transaction; or 
(2) The transaction is approved by the court after 
notice to interested persons. 1992 
75-3-713. Persons deal ing wi th personal representa-
tive — Protection. 
A person who in good faith either assists a personal repre-
sentative or deals with him for value is protected as if the 
personal representative properly exercised his power. The fact 
that a person knowingly deals with a personal representative 
does not alone require the person to inquire into the existence 
of a power or the propriety of its exercise. Except for restric-
tions on powers of supervised personal representatives which 
are endorsed on letters as provided in Section 75-3-504, no 
provision in any will or order of court purporting to limit the 
power of a personal representative is effective except as to 
persons with actual knowledge thereof. A person is not bound 
to see to the proper application of estate assets paid or 
delivered to a personal representative. The protection here 
expressed extends to instances in which some procedural 
irregularity or jurisdictional defect occurred in proceedings 
leading to the issuance of letters, including a case in which the 
alleged decedent is found to be alive. The protection here 
expressed is not by substitution for that provided by compa-
rable provisions of the laws relating to commercial transac-
tions and laws simplifying transfers^ of securities by fiducia-
ries. " 1975 
75-3-714. Transactions authorized for personal repre-
sentatives — Exceptions. 
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by this code, by 
the will or by an order in a formal proceeding and subject to 
the priorities stated in Section 75-3-902, a personal represen-
tative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested 
persons, may properly: 
(1) retain assets owned by the decedent pending distri-
bution or liquidation including those in which the repre-
sentative is personally interested or which are otherwise 
improper for trust investment; 
(2) receive assets from fiduciaries, or other sources; 
(3) perform, compromise, or refuse performance of the 
decedent's contracts that continue as obligations of the 
estate, as he may determine under the circumstances. In 
performing enforceable contracts by the decedent to con-
vey or lease land, the personal representative, among 
other possible courses of action, may: 
(a) execute and deliver a deed of conveyance for 
cash payment of all sums remaining due or the 
purchaser's note for the sum remaining due secured 
by a mortgage or deed of trust on the land; or 
(b) deliver a deed in escrow with directions that 
th2 proceeds, when paid in accordance with the 
escrow agreement, be paid to the successors of the 
decedent, as designated in the escrow agreement; 
(4) satisfy written charitable pledges of the decedent 
irrespective of whether the pledges constituted binding 
obligations of the decedent or were properly presented as 
claims, if in the judgment of the personal representative 
the decedent would have wanted the pledges completed 
under the circumstances; 
(5) if funds are not needed to meet debts and expenses 
currently payable and are not immediately distributable, 
deposit or invest liquid assets of the estate, including 
moneys received from the sale of other assets, in federally 
insured interest-bearing accounts, readily marketable se-
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therein shall, in addition to an award of costs as otherwise 
provided, recover from the losing party therein such sum as 
counsel fees as shall be allowed by the court The official bond 
of any such officer shall be liable for any such costs and 
attorney fees iM3 
78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action. 
"Parties to a question in difference, which might be trie 
subject of a civil action, may without action agree upon a case 
containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and 
present a submission of the same to any court which would 
have jurisdiction if an action had been brought But it must 
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and that the 
proceeding is m good faith, to determine the rights of the 
parties The court must thereupon hear and determine the 
case and render judgment thereon as if an action were 
pendmg i»*3 
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or 
death upon death of wrongdoer or injured 
person — Exception and restriction to out-of-
pocket expenses. 
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence 
of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer 
or the injured person The injured person or the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a 
cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general 
damages, subject to Subsection (lXb) 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured per-
son dies as a result of a cause other than the injury 
received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of 
the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of 
that person are entitled to receive no more than the 
outrof-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of tfrat 
injured person as the result of his injury 
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died may 
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence 
other than the testimony of that injured person lWi 
78-11-12.5. Proceeds received by criminals as result of 
crime — Delivery to Division of Finance — 
Trust fund — Distribution to crime victims — 
Custody and control — Sale of real property 
and securities — Definitions — Accused men-
tally ill — Notice — Return to accused — 
Reimbursement for legal defense of indigent 
accused. 
(1) Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, associa-
tion, or other legal entity contracting or otherwise arranging 
with any person accused or convicted of a crime in this state, 
the representative or assignee of that person, or any other 
person or entity, to provide information regarding that person 
with respect to the reenactment or fictionahzation of that 
crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article, radio or 
television presentation, live entertainment of any land, or 
from the expression of that person's thoughts, feelmgs, opin-
ions, or emotions regarding the crime, shall pay or deliver to 
the Division of Finance for deposit m the Crime Victims' 
Reparations Trust Fund any proceeds which would otherwise, 
by terms of the contract or other arrangement, be owing 
directly or indirectly to that person who is accused or con-
victed or his representatives or assignees The Division of 
Finance shall deposit the proceeds in the trust fund for the 
benefit of and payable to any victim of crimes committed by 
that person if 
(a) the person is eventually convicted of a crime based 
on the facts upon which the reenactment or nationaliza-
tion is based, and 
(b) the victim brings a civil action within six years of 
the date the trust account has been established, an<j 
recovers a money judgment against the person or repre-
sentative 
(2) (a) Where more than one victim establishes a claim 
against the proceeds, the court shall apportion the pro-
ceeds equitably, among all the, victims who obtain, acaoa^y 
judgment 
(b) The court may make a partial or full distribution of 
the proceeds prior to the six-year statute of limitations 
provided in this section 
(c) At any point in the proceedings where a victim is a 
minor under state law, the court shall appoint a guardian 
ad litem to petition the court for a conservator under Title 
75, Chapter 5, Part 4, to protect that minor's interests in 
the trust account 
(3) Proceeds deposited in the trust fund shall be invested in 
accordance with Title 51, Chapter 7, State Money Manage-
ment Act of 1974 The Division of Finance shall deposit 
investment income in the trust fund and reinvest earnings for 
the fund 
(4) When the compensation to the person convicted of the 
crime is of a nature that it cannot be placed in a trust account, 
the Division of Finance assumes custody, title, or possession of 
the property for benefit of and payable to any victim of the 
crime For purposes of this section, the date the Division of 
Finance assumes custody is considered the date a trust 
account is established 
(a) Where the proceeds are real property, the Division 
of Fmance shall, as soon as practicable after taking title to 
the property, obtain at least three mdependent appraisals 
of the value of the property and then make a good faith 
effort to sell the property for at least the amount of the 
lowest appraisal If the real property has not been sold 
within two years after receipt, the Division of Finance 
shall sell it to the highest bidder at public sale in 
whatever city m or out of the state affords m his judgment 
the most favorable market for the property mvolved He 
may declme the highest bid and reoffer the property for 
sale if in his judgment the bid is insuigcient If m his 
judgment the probable cost of sale exceeds the value of the 
property, it need not be offered for sale 
(b) Securities listed on an established stock exchange 
may be sold only at prices prevailing at the time of sale 
and may be sold over the counter or by any other method 
the Division of Finance considers advisable 
(c) The purchaser of property at any sale conducted by 
the director of the Division of Fmance pursuant to this 
chapter takes the property free of all claims of the owner 
or previous holder of the property and of all persons 
claiming through or under them The director shall ex-
ecute all documents necessary to complete the transfer of 
ownership 
(5) For purposes of this section 
(a) "Convicted person" includes a person found not 
guilty as a result of the defense of mental illness pursuant 
to Section 76-2-305 
(b) "Person convicted of a crime" mcludes any person 
convicted of a crane committed in this state either by 
entry of a plea of guilty or by conviction after trial, and 
any person who has voluntarily and knowingly admitted 
the commission of a crime for which the person is not 
convicted 
(c) "Proceeas" mclude property or other compensation 
(d) "Victim" means a person who suffers personal, 
physical mental, or emotional injury, or pecuniary loss, as 
a direct result of the crime, or the legal representative 
acting on behalf of the victim 
ADDENDUM "B" 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
MARJORIE S. SIMS 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That I, MARJORIE S. SIMS, of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not 
acting under duress or influence of any kind, 60 make anc declare 
this document to be my Last Will and Testament* 
ARTICLE I 
I hereby revoke all former or other Wills or Codicils 
previously made by me at any time. 
ARTICLE II 
I hereby order and direct that the expenses of my last 
illness, bjrial and funeral expenses, estate and inheritance 
taxes, and all my other just debts and obligations, be paid and 
dischargee as soon as this can con v o n : e n t 1 y be c o n c- =!' ter m y 
death. 
ARTICLE 13 1 
I h e r e b y a p p o i n t my n i e c e , L i n d a \:ooc, t : a c t a s my 
P e r s o n a ] R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h i s my Las t Wi ] 1 and T e s t a m e n t , and 
h a v i n g c o n f i d e n c e i n h e r i n t e g r i t y , I d i r e c t t h a t s h e s h a l l s o 
a c t w i t h o u t bond o r s e c u r i t y . In t h e o v o n t t h a t s a i d P i n d a V.'ooc 
i s j n a b l e f o r any r e a s o n t o s e r v e a s my P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , 
I h e r e b y a p p o i n t T e r r y S h o r t t o a c t ; a s my P e r s o n a l 
of sojnd mind, and under no constraint or jncue infljence. 
M A D T n D T P l c C TMC MARJORIE \S. SIMS 
WE, t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , a s w i t n e s s e s , s i g n o u r n a m e s t o 
t h i s i n s t r u m e n t / b e i n g f i r s t d u l y s w o r n , and do h e r e b y d e c l a r e t o 
t h e u n d e r s i g n e d a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e T e s t a t r i x s i g n s and e x e c u t e s 
t h i s i n s t r u m e n t a s h e r L a s t W i l l and T e s t a m e n t and t h a t s h e s i g n s 
i t w i l l i n g l y and t h a t e a c h of u s , i n t h e p r e s e n c e and h e a r i n g of 
t h e T e s t a t r i x a n d o r e a c h o t h e r , h e r e b y s i g n s t h i s W i l l a s 
w i t n e s s t o t h e T e s t a t r i x ' s s i g n i n g , a n d t h a t t o t h e b e s t o t o u r 
k n o w l e d g e t h e T e s t a t r i x i s 18 y e a r s o f a g e o r o l d e r , of s o u n d 
m i n d , and u n d e r no c o n s t r a i n t o r undue i n f l u e n c e . 
NAME ADDRESS 
COULTY Or SALT LAKE) 
) S S . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SUBSCRIBED ALL SWORN t o b e f o r e me 
fww 
ADDENDUM "C" 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
RLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 H 1991 
GEORGE GRANT SIMS 
I, GEORGE GRANT SIMS, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
* v^ 
being of* sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make and 
publish this, my Last Will and Testament. 
ARTICLE 2 
REVOCATION OF PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS 
I hereby revoke all other wills and codicils heretofore made 
by me. 
ARTICLE Tl 
WIFE AND BENEFICIARIES 
I am married to MARJORIE S. SIMS (hereinafter referred to as 
"my wife"). The beneficiary of my estate will be my wife (either 
outright or in trust, or both, as hereinafter set forth) or, if 
she predeceases me, the beneficiaries of my estate shall be the 
individuals named or indicated in Article V. 
ARTICLE III 
PAYMENT OF TAXES, DEBTS AND EXPENSES 
I direct that all of my due and unpaid debts, all expenses 
of my last illness, burial, and the administration of my estate, 
and all taxes due at the date of my death or as a result of my 
death, shall be paid as soon after my death as practical. 
Ms 
ARTICLE .IV 
BEQUEST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EFFECTS 
I hereby give, devise and bequeath certain items of my 
tangible personal property to those persons in the manner set 
forth in a written statement or list which has been, or which 
will be, prepared, dated and signed by me and attached to this 
Will and which statement or list I intend to be in existence at 
the time of my death. Said lirt describes the items devised and 
the devisees thereof. All of the rest and residue of my personal 
effects, including all household furniture and contents, jewelry, 
automobiles, and the like, I leave to my wife if she survives me. 
However, if my wife predeceases me, all of my personal property 
and effects not set forth in the attached list shall become a 
part of the residue of my estate and be disposed of as 
hereinafter set forth. 
ARTICLE V 
BEQUEST OF RESIDUE OF ESTATE 
If my wife survives me, my personal representative shall 
divide the residue of my estate into two parts, hereinafter 
referred to as Part A (the "GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS 
TRUST") and Part B (the "MARJORIE S. SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION 
PORTION") each ascertained as hereinafter set forth in Article 
VIII. 
2 #?£ 
The M a r j o r i e S. S ims M a r i t a l D e d u c t i o n P o r t i o n s h a l l be 
d i s t r i b u t e d a s s o o n a f t e r my d e a t h as p r a c t i c a l t o my w i f e 
o u t r i g h t and t r e e of t r u s t . 
The George Grant Sims E s t a t e Tax Bypass Trus t s h a l l be held 
i n Trust by t h e T r u s t e e s h e r e i n a f t e r named f o r the b e n e f i t of my 
w i f e during her l i f e t i m e . The T r u s t e e s s h a l l d i s t r i b u t e t o her 
w i t h o u t any c o n d i t i o n s , a l l of t h e income of s a i d t r u s t . The 
T r u s t e e s s h a l l a l s o d i s t r i b u t e as mu^h of t h e p r i n c i p a l as i s 
n e c e s s a r y f o r her proper h e a l t h , support / and maintenance and t o 
mainta in her i n the s tandard ot l i v i n g that she enjoyed during my 
l i f e t i m e . Upon the d e a t h of my w i f e , t h e T r u s t e e s h a l l pay t o 
the f o l l o w i n g p e r s o n s , the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c sums: 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o DONALD E. SMITH, MD 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o MARK MUIR, MD 
The T r u s t e e s h a l l then d i s t r i b u t e the r e s i d u e of t h i s Trust 
in the f o l l o w i n g manner: 
ONE-THIRD: ELNA MITCHELL 
ONE-THIRD: NEIL MITCHELL 
ONE-THIRD: LINDA WOOD 
If any o f t h e above i n d i v i d u a l s , e x c e p t LINDA WOOD, a r e 
t h e n d e c e a s e d , h i s or h e r s h a r e s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d t o h i s or 
h e r i s s u e by r i g h t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . As t o LINDA WOOD, i f s h e 
should be d e c e a s e d a t the t ime of my death , then her share s h a l l 
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be d i s t r i b u t e d t o IAN MITCHELL and-AMY MITCHELL, in e q u a l s h a r e s . 
I f my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e r e s i d u e of my e s t a t e s h a l l be 
d i s t r i b u t e d t o : DONALD E. SMITH, MD. and MARK MUIR, MD., 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 e a c h and t o ELNA MITCHELL, NEIL MITCHELL and LINDA 
WOOD, o n e - t h i r d e a c h , b u t i f any of t h e m , e x c e p t LINDA WOOD, 
p r e d e c e a s e m e , t h e n t o h i s o r h e r i s s u e b y r i g h t o f 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I f LINDA WOOD p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e n h e r s h a r e 
s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d t o IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHELL, in e q u a l 
s h a r e s . 
ARTICLE VI 
COMMON DISASTER 
I n t h e e v e n t my w i f e and I d i e u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t 
i t c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d w h i c h of u s w e r e f i r s t t o d i e , a l l 
p r o p e r t i e s o t my e s t a t e s h a l l be a d m i n i s t e r e d as though my w i f e 
were t h e l a s t t o d i e . 
ARTICLE VII 
APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES 
1 . A p p o i n t m e n t of P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I a p p o i n t my 
w i f e t o be P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f my W i l l . I f my w i f e d o e s 
n o t s u r v i v e me or i s o t h e r w i s e u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e a s 
p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , then I appoint my nephew, NEIL MITCHELL, 
t o s e r v e a s c o - p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of my e s t a t e . In t h e 
e v e n t b o t h a r e u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e a s P e r s o n a l 
4 
Representative of my Will, the Personal Representative shall be 
IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL. 
2. Appointment of Trustees. I appoint my wife and NEIL 
MITCHELL, to be the co-trustees of the George Grant Sims Estate 
Tax Bypass Trust created under this Will. In the event either 
Trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, the other of them shall 
serve as Trustee. In the event both are unable or unwilling to 
serve, the other of them shall serve as Trustee. In the ^vent 
both are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the Trustee 
shall be IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL. 
3. Appointment of Guardian and Conservator. In the event I 
become incompetent during my lifetime, I direct that my wife be 
appointed the guardian of my person and the conservator ot my 
estate. If she is unable or unwilling to serve, I direct that 
NEIL MITCHELL be appointed guardian and conservator or, if he is 
unable or unwilling to serve, then IAN MITCHELL, his son shall 
serve as the sole guardian and conservator. My guardian and 
conservator shall serve without bond. I direct that as long as 
there are funds available I be taKen care of in my home and not 
placed in a nursing home or similar facility unless home care is 
impossible because of the nature of the care required. It is my 
desire and direction that whatever funds are necessary be spent 
for my support, care and maintenance without regard or concern 
5 <?Q£ 
f o r c o n s e r v i n g a n y p o r t i o n of my e s t a t e f o r s u b s e q u e n t 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' t he reo f* 
ARTICLE V I I I 
ASCERTAINMENT OF GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS TRUST 
AND MARJORIE S. SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION PORTION, 
I f my w i f e s u r v i v e s me , P a r t A and P a r t B a s s e t f o r t h i n 
A r t i c l e V s h a l l be a s c e r t a i n e d a s f o l l o w s : 
1. There s h a l l f i r s t be de te rmined the value of tay g ross 
e s t a t e (including property not administered in my es t a t e ) for the 
purpose of the United States Federal Esta te Tax. 
2. There s h a l l be deducted from such value the amount, to 
the e x t e n t a l l o w a b l e as a deduc t ion in the computat ion of the 
Federal Esta te Tax, of a l l funeral and adminis t ra t ion expenses, 
and a l l claims against my e s t a t e but there s h a l l not be deducted 
any e s t a t e , i n h e r i t a n c e , t r a n s f e r , legacy or succes s ion t a x e s , 
r e f e r r e d t o in A r t i c l e I I I . The amount so de te rmined s h a l l be 
paid out pursuant to Ar t ic le I I I above. 
3* Part A sha l l be equal to the amount (current ly $600,000) 
that may pass free of Federal Es ta te Tax by reason ot the Unified 
Credit Against Tax under Sect ion 2010 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended (or i t s successor) reduced by the total 
of (1) a l l items includable in my e s t a t e for federal e s t a t e tax 
purposes which are disposed of in previous Articles ot this Will 
a&£ 
or which pass outside of this Will but only if such items do not 
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction or the 
federal estate tax charitable deduction, and (2) the amount of 
any administration expenses claimed as income tax rather than 
estate tax deductions. Part A shall be held, administered and 
distributed as set forth in Article V. 
For purposes ot allocating my residuary estate between Part 
A and Part B, all property owned by me at the time of my death 
shall be valued at the same value that was used for federal 
estate tax purposes. If I should die possessed of any terminable 
or other interest which cannot quality for the "marital 
deduction" under the Federal Estate Tax law, such interest shall 
be allocated to this Part A. If there are any federal or state 
estate and inheritance taxes due and payable on my death, they 
shall be paid out of the toregoing assets allocated to Part A. 
No estate taxes shall be paid out of Part B. 
4. Part B shall consist ot the rest, residue and remainder 
of my estate not disposed of pursuant to the foregoing provisions 
of my Will. I hereby direct that whenever possible, assets that 
will qualify for the federal estate tax "marital deduction" shall 
be allocated to Part B after, however, Part A is properly funded. 
If there are assets that will not qualify for the marital 
deduction I direct that those assets be allocated, to the extent 
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p o s s i b l e wi thou t exceeding the l i m i t s s e t fo r th above, to P a r t A 
above . I f t h e r e a r e a s s e t s t h a t w i l l c a u s e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on 
Pa r t A to be exceeded, those a s s e t s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o P a r t B 
a l t h o u g h t h e y w i l l n o t q u a l i f y f o r t h e m a r i t a l d e d u c t i o n . The 
d e c i s i o n of my P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s t o t h e p r o p e r t y t o be 
a l l o c a t e d t o Pa r t A and P a r t B s h a l l be f i n a l and conc lu s ive and 
binding upon a l l b e n e f i c i a r i e s . However, the p r o p e r t y a l l o c a t e d 
t o P a r t B s h a l l have an a g g r e g a t e f a i r m a r k e t va lue - c l e a r l y 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the a p p r e c i a t i o n or d e p r e c i a t i o n in the value 
t o the d a t e of d a t e s of each d i s t r i b u t i o n of a l l p r o p e r t y t h e n 
a v a i l a b l e f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n . P a r t B s h a l l no t be d i m i n i s h e d by 
any e s t a t e , i n h e r i t a n c e , t r a n s f e r , legacy or succes s ion t axes or 
d u t i e s , e i t h e r s t a t e or f e d e r a l . I f t h e v a l u e of my r e s i d u a r y 
e s t a t e i s l e s s t h a n t h e amount t h a t may be a l l o c a t e d t o P a r t A 
( c u r r e n t l y $600,000), no p a r t o£ my e s t a t e s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o 
Par t B. 
ARTICLE IX 
TRUSTEE POWERS 
Trus t ee s h a l l have the a d d i t i o n a l powers , a u t h o r i t i e s , and 
d i s c r e t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n Part 4, Chapter 7, T i t l e 75 of the 
Uniform T r u s t e e s 1 Powers P r o v i s i o n s of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code (or i t s s u c c e s s o r ) , which are i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by 
reference* 
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I , GEORGE GRANT SIMS, the T e s t a t o r , s i g n my name t o t h i s 
i n s t r u m e n t t h i s J j . ^ d a y o f J u l y , 1 9 9 1 , and b e i n g f i r s t du l y 
sworn, do hereby d e c l a r e t o the unders igned a u t h o r i t y that I s i g n 
i t w i l l i n g l y (or w i l l i n g l y d i r e c t another t o s i g n for me), t h a t I 
e x e c u t e i t a s my f r e e and v o l u n t a r y a c t f o r t h e p u r p o s e s 
e x p r e s s e d i n i t , and t h a t I am e i g h t e e n (18 ) y e a r s of age o r 
o l d e r , of sound mine, and under no cc(n?stp*aint or urjj^ ue ijnf^Lyence. 
GEORGE GRANT SIMS, T e s t a t o r 
WE, t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , as w i t n e s s e s , s i g n our names t o 
t h i s i n s t r u m e n t , be ing f i r s t duly sworn, and do hereby d e c l a r e t o 
t h e u n d e r s i g n e d a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e T e s t a t o r s i g n s and e x e c u t e 
t h i s ins trument as h i s Last W i l l and Testament and that he s i g n s 
i t w i l l i n g l y and tha t each of u s , in the p r e s e n c e and hear ing of 
t h e T e s t a t o r and or e a c h o t h e r , hereby s i g n s t h i s W i l l as w i t n e s s 
t o the T e s t a t o r ' s s i g n i n g , and that t o the b e s t of our knowledge 
t h e T e s t a t o r i s 18 y e a r s of age or o l d e r , of sound mind, and 
under no c o n s t r a i n t or undue i n f l u e n c e . 
s& NAME ADDRESS *& ^ T J w ^2.KZ- S^<^L^ ^LjU, 
y& 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
) SS. 
STATE OF UTAH - ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o betore me by GEORGE GRANT SIMS, 
the T e s t a t o r , o r , and s u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o be fore me by 
£./c<L/Ati F- ov£/ern>ti ai md MArVfoJ £ TJXA/A/ 
w i t n e s s e s , t h i s J?<% day of Ju ly , 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
-y-y*/
 : 
NOTAR^r^SrfcK—*TCCT^p7^Tf 
Res la | ng^^t^v.
 h^>^^c rnc e 
^fg^W 
ADDENDUM "D" 
11 ."* * 
\\.-al '> 3 -,f ?q 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OP THE ESTATE : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
OF: 
: CASE NO. 933900278 
MARJORIE S. SIMS, 
: 
Deceased. 
The above-referenced matter is before the Court on reciprocal 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The petitioner, Neil Mitchell, as 
successor personal representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims, 
originally filed his Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order 
from this Court that the original personal representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims, prior to her demise, failed to act in 
accordance with Mr. Sims' Will in funding a bypass trust, and was 
therefore required to return to Mr. Sims' Estate certain funds 
which the petitioner believes were inappropriately used by Mrs. 
Sims. Inasmuch as Mrs. Sims is deceased, the petitioner seeks 
repayment from the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims. 
The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, through its personal 
representative Lynda Wood, has filed in response to the 
aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment, a counter Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking from this Court an Order that the Estate 
of G. Grant Sims is not entitled to repayment of sums used by Mrs. 
Sims during her lifetime in her capacity as personal representative 
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of Mr. Sims' Estate. The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims does agree, 
however, that certain cash funds retained by Mrs. Sims while she 
was acting as personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Sims 
should be returned and has offered to return $48,100 of the 
$52,875.40 that the petitioner claimed was not deposited into Mr. 
Sims' Estate accounts. The difference between the $4 8,100 and the 
$52,875.4 0 are outlined in the Memoranda filed by Mr. McCoy on 
behalf of Lynda Wood, personal representative of the Marjorie S. 
Sims Estate, and have not been challenged as being inappropriate by 
the petitioner. 
While it is without dispute in this matter that Mrs. Sims as 
personal representative did not fund the trust as her deceased 
husband's Will provided, the manner in which she used the funds 
were, as a matter of law, funds that she would have been entitled 
to receive had she funded the trust as Mr. Sims' Will provided. The 
terms of the trust would have allowed Mrs. Sims to receive the 
funds she took, without any depletion of her own funds. 
Accordingly, while there was a technical breach of her fiduciary 
responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in 
no damages and therefore is not actionable. 
The intent of Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than 
conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries. That purpose was 
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adhered to by Mrs. Sims, albeit not in strict compliance with the 
formal procedures his Will required. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the Estate 
of Marjorie Sims has no obligation to repay the Estate of G. Grant 
Sims, with the exception of the $48,100 which the personal 
representative of Marjorie Sims has offered to return heretofore. 
As those funds should properly be with the Estate of Grant Sims, 
the Estate of Marjorie Sims is to repay that amount to his Estate 
forthwith. 
There is a question regarding funds received by Mrs. Sims in 
her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims' Estate for 
personal injury and a subsequent settlement after Mr. Sims died. 
The evidence is undisputed that the personal injury claim arose 
before Mr. Sims' death, but was settled after his death. The 
applicable statutory provisions provide that the only claims that 
survive a death are claims for expenses related to the injury, 
where the death of the personal injury claimant is not related to 
the personal injury claim. The settlement was for $12,445.86, and 
as it was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it was for actual 
expenses incurred by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury, 
and pursuant to statute is required to be paid over to the personal 
representative of the deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate, or the heirs 
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of the deceased if a death was intestate• As Mr. Sims did not die 
intestate, the funds were properly paid to Mrs. Sims in her 
capacity as personal representative, and should have been deposited 
in the accounts for the Estate, the funds representing expenses 
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury 
case. 
Accordingly, the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims is also required 
to repay the Estate of G. Grant Sims the sum of $12,445.86, 
representing an improper diversion of the personal injury 
settlement funds received by Mrs. Sims after her husband's death. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court has granted the Summary 
Judgment of the petitioner, Neil Mitchell, in part as it relates to 
the personal injury settlement funds, and has granted the Summary 
Judgment of the personal representative of the Marjorie S. Sims 
Estate in part. The Court determines that the amounts to be paid 
from Marjorie S. Sims Estate to the G. Grant Sims Estate of $4 8,100 
is not subject to this Summary Judgment, even though the Order 
should contain a requirement for such payment based upon the fact 
that said sums have been offered and outstanding for some 
substantial period of time and have not really been at issue. 
Counsel for the parties are to confer and determine the manner 
in which an appropriate Order encompassing the decisions of this 
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Court on the reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment can be 
drafted. Inasmuch as the Court has partially granted each Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Order needs to provide that an approval 
as to form, or the participation in the preparation of an Order 
encompassing the Court's rulings on these reciprocal Motions for 
Summary Judgment does not constitute a waiver of either side to 
object and pursue an appropriate appeal in relation to the Court's 
ruling contained in the Order. 
' Once the Order has been properly prepared and approved by both 
sides as being reflective of this Court's decision, the same should 
be submitted to the Court for its reviev/and signature pursuant to 
the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this /-^dav of March/ 1995 
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS JS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH. 
J^JQJV— 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
A-
March, 1995: 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this A—) day of 
John L. McCoy 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
Lynda Wood 
310 S. Main, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John E. Gates 
Kim R, Wilson 
Attorneys for Personal Representative 
Neil Mitchell 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P-O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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JOHN E. GATES (A1169) 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, Successor 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of G. Grant Sims 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Of 
MARJORIE S. SIMS, Probate No. 933900278 ES 
Timothy R. Hanson 
Deceased. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Neil R. Mitchell 
("Mitchell"), as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate 
of G. Grant Sims (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking 
allowance of Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of 
Claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lynda Wood as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims (the 
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking denial of Mitchell's 
First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim came on for hearing 
pursuant to notice, before the above-entitled court, the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on January 13, 1995, at 
2:00 p.m. and Kim R. Wilson appeared for Mitchell and John L. 
McCoy appeared for Wood, and the Court having considered the 
""•fl lJuc;c,£l District 
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motions, the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the 
motions and the files and records herein, having heard arguments 
of counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated March 13, 
1995, which is incorporated herein by reference, and being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Mitchell's entitlement to payment of the sum of 
$48,100.00 is not contested, and Wood, be and the same is hereby 
directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of $48,100.00 
together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, until paid 
at the statutory rate of 10% per annum. 
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3. The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in 
part and denied in part. 
4. In addition to the amounts provided in Paragraph 1, 
Mitchell's claim is approved and allowed in the sum of $12,445.86 
and Wood is directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of 
$12,445.86 together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, 
until paid, at the statutory rate of io% per annum. 
5. Recovery is denied for all other amounts sought in 
Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
-2-
In accordance with Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court determines that there is no just reason for 
delay, and this Order is deemed to be a tjnial judgment. 
"-- -—- -° 4 u n X / , 1995. DATED this QQ day of
'imothy R. Hanson_ 
District Court Judg^1 ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN-N& M&KTINEAU 
'Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, 
Successor Personal Representative 
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims 
j^ hn L. McCoy 
ttorney for Lynda Woo^r Personal 
Representative ofthe Estate 
of Marjorie S/Sims 
t^-Ui 
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ADDENDUM HF» 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Karl F. LINDGREN, Deceased. 
No. 94-238. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted on Briefs Oct. 13, 1994. 
Decided Nov. 23. 1994. 
Conservator for testamentary trust ben-
eficiary petitioned for order requiring trustee 
to pay beneficiary's nursing home care and 
for beneficiary's burial and funeral costs. 
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Jefferson 
County, Frank M. Davis, J., ordered trust to 
pay one half of beneficiary's cost but refused 
to order reimbursement of costs or expenses 
from time following settlor's death and de-
nied conservator's request for attorney fees. 
Appeals were taken. The Supreme Court, 
Weber, J., held that: (I) under terms of 
trust, trustee was obligated to pay for ex-
penses incurred by beneficiary from date of 
settlor's death, but (2) conservator was not 
entitled to attorney fees absent statutory or 
contractual authority. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Trieweiler, J., specially concurred and 
filed opinion in which Gray, J., joined. 
1. Appeal and Error ^1008.1(5) 
Supreme Court reviews district court's 
findings as to whether they are "clearly erro-
neous"; that is whether findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, whether dis-
trict court correctly apprehended evidence, 
and whether reviewing court is left with firm 
conviction that mistake has been made. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
2. Appeal and Error C=>842(2) 
Supreme Court's review of conclusions 
of law is simply whether conclusions are cor-
rect. 
3. Wills <3=>684.2(4) 
Testamentary trust created to provide 
for generous care and support of settlor's 
wife, for purpose of caring for wife from time 
of settlor's death to her own death, was 
solely liable for wife's nursing home care 
expenses from day of settlor's death, as well 
as complete funeral burial expenses for wife, 
notwithstanding wife's personal assets. 
L Wills c=>4*6 
When wording of will is clear and unam-
biguous, court shall not consider extrinsic 
evidence or circumstances surrounding exe-
cution of will. 
5. Costs ^194.16 
Attorney fees cannot be awarded in ab-
sence of statutory contractual authority, or 
bad faith or malicious behavior. 
ti. Trusts c=>377 
Conservator for testamentary trust ben-
eficiary was not entitled to attorney fees 
incurred in suit to compel trustee to pay for 
expenses incurred by beneficiary for nursing 
home care and funeral and burial costs given 
that there is no statutory or contractual au-
thority for award of fees, and trustee's ac-
tions were neither bad faith nor malicious 
behavior, as needed for equitable award of 
fees. 
John T. Jones, Moulton, Bellingham, Lon-
go & Mather, Billings, for appellant. 
Gene A. Picotte, Helena, for respondent. 
WEBER, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a probate order 
issued by the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Jefferson County. We reverse in part and 
affirm in part. 
WTe consider the following issues on appeal: 
I. Did the District Court err in ordering 
the Trustee to invade the Trust estate to 
the extent of paying one half of Anna D. 
Lindgren's monthly health care and hous-
ing costs? 
II. Did the District Court err in denying 
the Conservator's request for reimburse-
ment of the nursing care and housing costs 
that Anna D. Lindgren's conservatorship 
incurred prior to June 1, 1994? 
III. Did the District Court err in order-
ing the Trustee to invade the Trust estate 
to pay one-half of Anna D. Lindgren's 
burial and funeral expenses? 
IV. Did the District Court err in denying 
Conservator's request for attorney fees? 
Karl F. Lindgren (hereinafter Decedent) 
ed on April 15, 1993, in Lewis & Clark 
ounty, Montana. Decedent's will estab-
ihed a Trust in which his surviving spouse, 
i Alzheimer sufferer, is the sole beneficiary 
ereinafter referred to as Beneficiary.), 
le Trustee of the Trust is Decedent's cous-
, Gladys E. Tellessen (hereinafter referred 
as Trustee.) The purposes of the Trust 
e to "provide for and assure so far as 
>ssible, the generous care and support" of 
^nefkiary during her lifetime and to pay 
r her burial and funeral expenses. 
On August 2. 1993, the Thirteenth Judicial 
strict Court, Yellowstone County, appoint-
Patsy A. Martin (hereinafter referred to 
Conservator), daughter of Beneficiary-, to 
rve as the guardian and conservator for 
meficiary, due to her deteriorating condi-
>n. Beneficiary resides in a Billings nurs-
y home and incurs $3,000 per month nurs-
l care expenses. Conservator has request-
that the Trustee of the Testamentary 
" rr.t* m-nitniy '.'uiv '»i Beneiiciary. Iru.-r- •-
s refused all buch requests for aid because 
weficiary has failed to establish a financial 
ed. 
Conservator petitioned the probate court 
• an order requiring the Trustee of Karl 
ndgren's Testamentary Trust to distribute 
:ome and/or principal from the Trust to 
y for Beneficiary, Anna D. Lindgren's 
rsing care, medications, and expense^. 
z(\ *h<j n^titi^r -^ ucrht roimHn .^iiYtorif f >• 
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the funds Conservator had expended on the 
care of Beneficiary since the death of Mr. 
Lindgren. 
The court issued its findings and order on 
April 22, 1994. That order ruled that the 
Trustee must invade the Trust to pay for 
one-half of Anna Lindgren's monthly health 
care and housing costs and one half of her 
burial and funeral costs. Also, in that order 
the court denied the request for reimburse-
ment of Beneficiary's expenses from the time 
period of her husband's death to June 1, 
1994. Finally, the court denied Conserva-
tor's request for attorney fees. 
Conservator filed a Notice of Appeal on 
May 18, 1994; she amended, and refiled the 
appeal on May 24, 1994. Trustee filed a 
Notice of Cross-Appeal on June 1, 1994. 
I 
Did the District Court err in ordering the 
Trustee to invade the Trust estate to the 
extent of paying one half of Anna D. Lind-
gren's monthly health care and housing 
costs? 
Conservator argues that tne wording of 
the Trust makes it clear that the Trust was 
supposed to assume the expense of Beneficia-
ry's care and support following the death of 
Karl Lindgren. Conservator contends that 
the Trustee abused her discretion by refus-
ing all requests for help. 
The respondent Trustee argues that the 
word ''Necessary" in the Trust means that 
Beneficiary must expend her own funds be-
fore the Trustee invades the Trust. 
nuitni \>r-
Wili. 
1. The term of this Trust is from the time 
of my death to the time of death of my 
wife, ANNA DELL LINDGREN. If said 
wife shall not survive me, this Trust shall 
not come into existence. 
2. The sole beneficiary of this Trust is my 
said wife, ANNA DELL LINDGREN. * 
3. The purpose.s of this Trust are to pro-
•Sfio r ,*• ITH a^ ^ ,rv *^ *"'** 'is r>»>s^ iMe. th° 
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generous care and support of my said wife. 
ANNA DELL LINDGREN, after my 
death for so long as she shall live and to 
provide for funeral, burial, and any other 
expenses attendant upon and resulting 
from her death. 
4. The Trustee shall, in her. his or its 
sound discretion, pay t<> or apply for my 
said wife as much of the Trust income and 
Trust principal as Trustee deems neces-
sary for her support, care and health dur-
ing her life time. The discretion of the 
Trustee shall be exercised liberally in favor 
of my said wife, it being my intention that 
she shall have, in addition to the necessi-
ties, a reasonable number of the luxuries of 
life, if she desires them. 
5. The Trustee shall have all of the pow-
ers, duties, and obligations set forth and 
described in Sections 72-21-101 through 
72-21-206, MCA. Any other powers, obli-
gations and duties in any other applicable 
laws of the State of Montana are also 
conferred upon the Trustee. 
6. Upon the death of my said wife after 
my death, this Trust shall terminate and 
the Trustee shall, with deliberate speed, 
convert the Trust property entirely to 
cash, and after payment of all debts and 
obligations of the Trust if any, distribute 
absolutely and unconditionally all thereof 
to the beneficiaries and in the amounts and 
proportions designated and determined by 
the provisions of Paragraph SEVENTH, 
hereinafter. 
[1,2] This Court reviews a district 
court's findings as to whether they are clear-
ly erroneous; that is whether they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, whether the 
court correctly apprehended the evidence, 
and despite the satisfaction of the first twTo 
concerns, whether we are still left with a firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. 
Tonack v. Montana Bank of Billings (1993), 
258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d 326. The Supreme 
Court's review of a district courts conclu-
sions of law is simply whether the conclu-
sions are correct. Weber v. Rivera (1992), 
255 Mont. 195, 841 P.2d 534. 
[3] The court found that the discretion-
ary provisions of the Trust justified the 
Trustee in denying Conservator's request for 
contribution to Beneficiary. The court found 
that there was no "need" for the Trust to be 
invaded. Having said this, however, the 
court went on to determine that the true 
spirit and intent of the will had been contra-
nicted. The court then charged the Trust 
with one half of Beneficiary's future expenses 
and one half of her future funeral and burial 
expenses. The court denied retroactive con-
tributions from the Trust concerning Mrs. 
Lindgren's care upon her husband's death 
and also denied Conservators request for 
attorney fees. 
[4] The District Court specifically points 
to the word "need" and roots its decision 
there. The Court should determine the tes-
tator's intent, the ruling concern, by analyz-
ing the will in its entirety, not select provi-
sions on their own. Matter of Estate of 
Evans (1985), 217 Mont. 89, 704 P.2d 35. In 
analyzing the entire Trust as a whole, we are 
left with the firm conviction that Karl Lind-
gren carefully worded the instrument to car-
ry out the specific purpose of caring for his 
wife from the time of his death to her own 
death. If the wording of the will is clear and 
unambiguous, the court shall not consider 
extrinsic evidence or the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the will. Matter of 
Estate of Greenfield (1988), 232 Mont. 357, 
757 P.2d 1297. 
What the District Court did was to set the 
word "need" above the intent of the Trust. 
That one word cannot be construed in such a 
way as to negate or even diminish the sole 
purpose of the Trust which was to provide 
Mr. Lindgren's beloved wife with monetary 
support for both necessities and luxuries dur-
ing her life and for funeral and burial ex-
penses upon death. We will not interpret 
the liberal Trust language by way of a limit-
ed reading of the word "necessary," referred 
to by the court as "need." The Trust does 
not itself contain any limiting language. 
While the Trust states that the Trustee has 
sound discretion it also directs the Trustee to 
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exercise that discretion "liberally" in favor of 
Mrs. Lindgren. There is nothing in the rec-
ord to indicate that the Trustee adopted this 
liberal attitude toward the care of the Benefi-
ciary. The Trustee denied every request for 
help from Mrs. Lindgren's Conservator. 
The denial was not in compliance with the 
purposes of the Trust. 
The Trustee would have us determine that 
Mrs. Lindgren must expend or dispose of her 
personal estate before the Trust can be in-
vaded. The Trust does not provide for the 
expenditure of Beneficiary's estate before 
any payments are to be made from the Trust. 
We will not read into the instrument this 
limitation. Nor will we consider case law 
from other jurisdictions when the Trust in-
strument itself is clear. 
We can reach no other conclusion than that 
the Trust itself is clearly worded to provide 
for Mrs. Lindgren's total care from the time 
of Mr. Lindgren's death until Mrs. Lind-
gren's own death. Therefore, it is the Trust 
itself that is solely liable for Mrs. Lindgren's 
care from the day her husband died. We 
hold that the District Court erred in ordering 
the Trustee to invade the Trust estate to the 
extent of Da vine half of Anna D. Lind-
cren's monthly health care and housing costs. 
We reverse the court order requiring the 
Trust to pay for only half of Mrs. Lindgren's 
expenses and direct the District Court to 
enter an order for the Trustee to pay for 
Mrs. Lindgren's total living and medical ex-
penses. 
II 
Did the District Court err in denying the 
r
 ••nser.'iitorV request for reimbursement of 
;•.- r.ui-.-.ne care ana housing costs that Anna 
D. Lindgren s conservatorship incurred prior 
to June 1, 1994? 
In its April 22, 1994 order the court direct-
ed the Trustee to pay for one half of Mrs. 
Lindgren's expenses beginning after June 1, 
1994. Appellant argues that she should be 
reimbursed for the money she spent from 
her mother's personal finances on her moth-
er's care before June 1, 1994. Respondent 
merely argues that Mrs. Lindgren's funds 
must be consumed before the Trust begins. 
Again, we emphasize that the clear lan-
guage of the Trust states that it begins "from 
the time of my death to the time of death of 
my wife, ANNA DELL LINDGREN." 
Therefore, the testators clear intent is that 
the Trust begin at his death. Because the 
Trustee failed to pay for any of Mrs. Lind-
gren's expenses in the manner in which the 
Trust directs, the court erred in refusing to 
reimburse Mrs. Lindgren's Conservator. 
We reverse the court's refusal to reim-
burse the Conservator for funds expended 
heretofore on Mrs. Lindgren's care. The 
court is directed to order the Trustee to 
reimburse the Conservator for all monies 
already spent for the care of Mrs. Lindgren 
from the date of Mr. Karl Lindgren's death. 
Ill 
Did the District Court err in ordering the 
Trustee to invade the Trust estate to pay 
one-half of Anna D. Lindgren's burial and 
funeral expenses? 
In addition to requiring the Trust to pay 
for half of Mrs. Lindgren's expenses, the 
court ordered the Trust to pay for half of her 
burial and funeral expenses. Appellant ar-
gues that the Trust provided for the com-
plete payment of Mrs. Lindgren's funeral 
and burial expenses. 
According to paragraph 3 of the Testamen-
tary- Trust, the Trustee has no discretion in 
paying Mrs. Lindgren's complete funeral and 
burial expenses. We hold that the District 
Court fired n: spliuini: the cost benve«-i; the 
parties. We reverse the District Court's rul-
ing on this issue and direct the court to issue 
an order that the Trust will be fully responsi-
ble for all burial and funeral expenses. 
IV 
Did the District Court err in denying Con-
servator's request for attorney fees? 
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Appellant argues that the court should 
have awarded her attorney fees because she 
had to file this action in order to force the 
Trust to begin its prescribed duties. Re-
spondent argues that in absence of a special 
statute, or stipulation of the parties, or rule 
of court, that attorney fees cannot be awTard-
ed. 
L5, 6J The District Court denied aiturntn 
fees. In this, the court was correct. The 
longstanding rule in Montana is that, absent 
statutory or contractual authority, attorney 
fees will not be awarded. Goodover v. Lin-
deys (1992), 255 Mont. 430, 843 P.2d 765. 
There is no statutory or contractual require-
ment for an award of attorney fees. 
In certain instances in which bad faith or 
malicious behavior are involved, this Court 
has made an equitable award of attorney 
fees. Goodover, 255 Mont, at 446, s43 P.2d 
at 771-75. However, this equitable confeder-
ation is only invoked infrequently. Good-
over, 255 Mont, at 446, 843 P.2d at 775. The 
record does not show either bad faith or 
malicious behavior. We affirm the denial of 
attorney fees. 
TURNAGE, C.J., and HARRISON, 
HUNT and NELSON, J J., concur. 
TRIEWEILER, Justice, specially 
concurring. 
I concur with the result of the majority 
opinion, but for reasons other than those set 
forth in that opinion. 
Paragraph 4 of Karl Lindgren's testamen-
tary trust directed the trustee to pay from 
trust income and principle those expenses 
"necessary for her [Anna's] support care, 
and health during her lifetime." (Emphasis 
added.) The issue in this case is simply 
whether the term ''necessary" describes the 
type of expenses to be paid for, or .Anna's 
financial need that those expenses be paid by 
the trust. 
This issue has been resolved in other juris-
dictions based on reasoning and precedent 
that I conclude is persuasive. 
In Godfrey v. Chandley (1991), 248 Kan. 
975, 811 P.2d 1248, the decedent established 
a testamentary trust for the benefit of his 
surviving spouse. In that trust, he provided 
that net income of the trust was to be paid to 
the beneficiary " 'as may be necessary for 
her support, health and maintenance.'" 
Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1250 (emphasis added). 
ucuuc, ub we are, wnether the oeneilciary 
was entitled to the trust income for her 
support, health, and maintenance without re-
gard to her personal income. The remain-
derman named in the will argued that the 
term "necessary" limited expenditures from 
trust income to "only those expenses wThich 
exceeded [the beneficiary's] personal in-
come." Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1251. Howev-
er, in concluding otherwise, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas set forth the following rules 
of interpretation: 
Whether a trustee can con>ider the per-
sonal income of a trust beneficiary is to be 
determined from the language of the in-
strument and surrounding circumstances. 
See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 811, p. 
229 (rev. 2d ed. 1981). Where the trust 
settlor manifests an intention that the 
trust property be applied to the beneficia-
ry's support only if and to the extent the 
beneficiary is in actual need, then the ben-
eficiary is not entitled to support from the 
trust fund if other sufficient resources are 
available. See Dunklee v. Kettering, 123 
Colo. 43, 46, 225 P.2d 853 (1950); First 
National Bank of Catawba County v. 
Edens, 55 N.CApp. 697, 704, 286 S.E.2d 
818 (1982). See generally 2 Scott on 
Trusts § 128.4 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1987). 
On the other hand, where a settlor directs 
the trustee to pay the beneficiary so much 
as is necessary for support and mainte-
nance, an inference arises that the settlor 
intended the beneficiary to receive support 
from the trust estate, regardless of other 
income. See Taylor v. Hutchinson, 17 
Ariz.App. 301, 304-05, 497 P.2d 527 (1972); 
Estate of Wells v. SanfordL Trustee, 281 
Ark. 242, 246-47, 663 S.W.2d 174 (1984); 
Hamilton Nat Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga. 
427, 428, 211 S.E.2d 723 (1975); In re 
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Coots Trust 581 S.W.2d 392, 393-96 (Mo. 
App.1979): see Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 128, comment e (1957). 
Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1251. 
For these reasons, the Kansas Court held 
as follows: 
We hold the trustee shall pay Peggy sup-
port, health, and maintenance for the peri-
od of her natural life irrespective of her 
individual income. The testator obviously 
intended to provide maintenance for his 
wife for her life. His provision is limited 
only by what is necessary. In other 
words, it cannot be used to provide nones-
sential items. 
Godfrey, 811 P.2d at 1253. 
The same interpretation of the word "nec-
essary," as it described expenditures from a 
testamentary trust, was applied in Rentier v. 
Costellano (N.J.Super.Ct.Ch.Div.1952), 21 
NJ.Super. 331, 91 A.2d 176, 180, where that 
court held that: 
The word "necessary" as used here in 
the first paragraph, considered with the 
context, and in the light of the surrounding 
circumstance^ refers to what is> required 
to accomplish testator's intention, namely, 
the comfortable maintenance and care of 
his widow, the scope, the range, and the 
cost of it. Without doing violence to every 
other expression in the will, it could not be 
said that the benefaction was conditional 
upon the widow's financial ability to sup-
port and maintain herself. Cf. Camden 
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Read, 124 
NJ.Eq. 599, 4 Aild 10 (Ch.1939), in which 
it was held that the word "necessary" did 
r->! reier to zht r>erier"L-.an - .nabi]itt» in 
meet the expense of certain stated contin-
gencies. 
In accord is Estate of Wells v. Sanford 
(1984), 281 Ark. 242, 663 S.W.2d 174, 176-77. 
Based on the above authority, I conclude 
that the term "necessary," as used in Para-
graph 4 of Karl Lindgren's testamentary 
trust, refers to the type of expenditures the 
trustee is authorized to incur. Thev include. 
at a minimum, those expenditures related to 
Anna's support, housing, and health care 
during her lifetime. The term "necessary," 
as used in Karl's testamentary trust, does 
not refer to Anna's ability to pay for those 
expenses from her own financial assets. 
For these reasons, I specially concur with 
the majority's conclusion that the trustee is 
obliged, under the terms of Karl Lindgren's 
testamentary7 trust, to pay for Anna Lind-
gren's total living and medical expenses from 
and after the date of her husband's death. 
I also concur with the majority's conclu-
sions under Issues III and IV of its opinion. 
GRAY, J., joins in the foregoing 
concurring opinion. 
Jack J. HALVERSON, Plaintiff 
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Shirley J. TURNER and Harold Turner, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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Dominant estate owner brought action 
against owners of servient estate, seeking to 
judicially establish existence of road ease-
ment over -anient estate. The Thirteenth 
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Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309, and Haar-
stitch v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 
Utah 552, 262 P. 100, will not be further 
extended to situations except where they 
are clearly applicable. As hitherto ex-
pressed in a former decision, I have doubt 
whether those cases did not present facts 
which warranted their submission to the 
jury. 
KIT I I M I t t STSTD4> 
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BEHM v. GEE. 
No. 7305. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 20, 1950. 
Proceeding in the matter of the estate of 
Venna Darlene Behm, on petition of Alma 
Gee, personally and as administrator of the 
estate of Venna Darlene IVhm, d^r-oasod, 
for appnnal of final account and distribu-
tion of tho funds remaining in his p()>vs-
sion, to which objections were fm'd ly Kd-
ward C. I.ehm. 
The Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County. A. II. Ellett, J., enteral a 
judgment adverse to petitioner, and peti-
tioner apj>ealed. 
The Supreme Court, Latimer, J., held that 
objectant'b assignment of his interest in any 
recovery that might be had against doctor 
for wrongfully causing death of deceased 
was valid and that the court erred in direct-
ing the clerk of the court to pay objectant's 
counsel a stated attorney's fee and that on 
a retrial the trial judge should determine 
the rel-itive !<><s(^  suffered ; v [he riut-' h".:^ 
and piuud" for a distributi-wi mi a p»-.;pur-
tioiiate IKIMS and award objectant's share 
to petitioner. 
Reversed. 
See also 213 P.2d 664. 
I. Morrison v. Perry, 104 Ftah 151. 140 
P.2.d 772; Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific 
Ky. Co., Ptah, 1S6 P.2d 29.]; Pool v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 7 Utah 303, 26 P. 
213 P.2<i—\2 
1. Executors and administrators <§=>5I 
Under wrongful death statute provid-
ing that action may be maintained by dece-
dent's heirs or his personal representatives 
for the benefit of his heirs the Legislature 
indicated that the proceeds obtained from 
the wrongdoer should not be intermingled 
with other assets of the estate of the de-
ceased. U.C.A.1943, 104—3— l l . 1 
2. Death C=>I0I 
Under the wrongful death statute the 
recovery must be distributed in proportion 
to the losses suffered by different heirs. 
U.C.A.1943, 104—3—11. 
3. Death <£=>I0I 
Where decedent left no estate and hus-
band had expended approximately $1,600 
for expenses of the last illness and burial 
purposes, the husband was at least entitled 
to recover the amount expended for burial 
purposes, and in view of the fact that he 
is made liable by statute for expenses of 
the last illness the same principle should 
apply to such expenses. U.C.A.1943, 104— 
3—11. 
4. Assignments C=»26 
A hu-naihi's interest in any recovery 
for wrongful death of the wife was assign-
able. U.C.A.P'43, ln4—3—ll. 
5. Assignments C=>48 
A court of equity will enforce an as-
signment of one's interest in proceeds of 
ciaim against a tort-feasor even though 
the cause of action is not assignable. 
6. Assignments C=>I37 
Finding that assignment of husband's 
interest in proceeds of action for wrongful 
death was procured by fraud was not 
sustained by the evidence. U.C.A.1943, 
104—3—11. 
7. Appeal ?nd f r G r ^ ! 0 l 0 i ! ) 
Trial C=396'2) 
Trial court's conclusion that assign-
ment of husband's interest in proceeds of 
action for wrongful death was barred be-
cause champertous could not be sustained 
654: Evans v. Oregon Short Line K. Co.. 
37 Utah 431, 108 I\ 638. Ann.C;is.l912C. 
259; Chilton v. Union I'ac. Ky. Co., 8 
Utah 47, 29 P. 963. 
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where the issue was never pleaded and 
evidence was insufficient to establish such 
contention. U.C.A.1943, 104—3—11. 
8. Trial <§=*396(l) 
The Supreme Court must liberally 
construe pleadings, but the findings as 
made should be within the framework of 
the petition as originally drawn or as 
amended, and there should be evidence to 
-upper: them. 
9. Assignments <©=355 
Where husband was unwilling to de-
vote time and money to prosecution of 
claim for wrongful death of wife and his 
father-in-law undertook the prosecution of 
such claim without any assurance of re-
turn, an assignment of husband's interest 
in the amount of recovery was supported 
by adequate consideration. U.C.A.1943, 
104—3—11. 
10. Death C=>I0I 
In proceeding which involved the dis-
tribution of proceeds of settlement of 
claim for wrongful death, where husband 
had assigned his interest in proceeds, trial 
court erred in awarding husband's attor-
ney fee, since husband had no interest in 
the award and the proceeds were no part 
of the estate, and estate which had not 
been benefited in any respect should not be 
burdened with litigation between the dis-
tributees. U.C.A.1943, 104—3—11.8 
11. Assignments €=392 
An assignor cannot depreciate an as-
signment by merely saying that he does not 
want the fund he is assigned, and the as-
signee can complain if he is denied re-
covery on his assignment. 
12. Assignments <§=*)2 
Where husband assigned any interest 
he might have in proceeds of claim for 
wrongful death and the assigned was ap-
pointed administrator of the estate and 
procured a settlement of such claim, the 
loss sustained by the husband by reason 
of such death should be awarded to the 
assignee in full settlement of all claims of 
assignee, including any claim he irr.ght 
assert for services rendered in his repre-
sentative capacity. U.C.A.1943, 104—3— 
11. 
Shirley P. Jones, Salt Lake City, Lewis 
Larson, Manti, for appellant. 
Ray S. McCarty, Salt Lake City, C. Ver-
non Langlois, Salt Lake City, for respond-
ent. 
LATIMER, Justice. 
Venna Darlene Behm died in childbirth 
on February 18, 1947, leaving a husband 
and two infant daughters surviving her. 
She was the wife of respondent Edward C. 
Behm and the daughter of appellant Alma 
Gee. While appellant believed the attend-
ing doctor was liable for his negligent 
treatment of deceased, the respondent ap-
parently concluded there was little chance 
of recovering from the doctor or else he 
did not desire to invest his time and money 
in litigation, as he was willing ro permit 
appellant to become the principal actor 
in this family tragedy. As a result of re-
spondent's attitude, it was largely through 
the efforts of appellant that suit was insti-
tuted against the physician for his alleged 
negligent treatment of the deceased and 
a settlement effectuated. 
Respondent, who claims to have been 
mentally upset by the death of his wife 
and not entirely cognizant of the things 
he was doing, concluded that appellant 
would be a proper person to represent the 
family in their litigation and that so long 
as he, appellant, would proceed with the 
details, there was little need of respondent 
concerning himself with the matter. Ac-
cordingly, on April 11, 1947, respondent 
joined in a petition to have appellant ap-
pointed administrator of the estate of re-
spondent's deceased wife. On the same 
date, respondent joined in a petition to 
have appellant appointed guardian of the 
estates of the two minor daughters with 
authority to settle and compromise any 
claim they might have against the physician 
for the death of their mother. Pursuant to 
the petitions, appellant was appointed ad-
ministrator of the estate of his deceased 
2. In re Yonks Estate, Utah, 204 P.2d 452. 
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daughter and guardian of the estates of respondent's interest, and two-thirds to 
the granddaughters. Prior to the hearing 
on these petitions and on or about April 
28, 1947, respondent executed a written 
assignment in which he assigned to appel-
lant any interest he might have in and to 
any sum that might be recovered from the 
doctor. 
On January 7, 1948, appellant as admin-
istrator petitioned the court for authority 
to settle the claims of the heirs for the 
sum of $15,000 and for authority to pay 
his attorney a proportionate part of the 
recovery. The court issued an order in 
accordance with the prayer of the petition 
and thereafter a settlement was effectuated. 
The draft given to appellant for final settle-
ment cleared through clearing house chan-
nels and on January 28, 1948, appellant 
deposited the money to his credit in his 
capacity as administrator. No further pro-
ceedings appear in the file until April 23, 
1948, although the transcript shows that a 
dispute arose between appellant and re-
spondent and that between the date of the 
settlement and April 23, 1948, respondent 
consulted with counsel who in turn dis-
cussed compromise solutions with counsel 
for appellant. No agreement was reached 
during these discussions, so on the latter 
date respondent filed a petition in which he 
requested the court to issue an order re-
quiring appellant to show cause as to why 
he should not immediately distribute the 
funds in his possession, and to further show 
cause why the court should not declare the 
pretended assignment executed by respond-
ent as being null and void. In substance, 
the grounds alleged in the petition for de-
feating the assignment were, unassignabil-
ity and fraud in inducing appellant to ex-
ecute the instrument. 
by appellant but these were overruled. Ap-
pellant then filed his final account and 
petition for approval and distribution of 
the funds remaining in his possession. 
Passing over the incidental expenditures 
included in the a .count appellant requested 
authority to p'±y an additional attorney's 
fee and an administrator's fee and to dis-
tribute the remaining sum in three equal 
parts, one-third to himself as assignee of 
himself as guardian of the estates of the 
two minor children. 
Respondent filed his objections to this 
account and the grounds used as the basis 
for his objections were substantially the 
same as those set forth in his previous peti-
tion to invalidate the assignment, namely, 
fraud in procuring the assignment and un-
assignability. There were some other 
grounds mentioned but they are of no 
materiality to this decision as they deal 
principally with appellant's competency to 
act as guardian for the infants, and an-
other suit deals with that litigation. How-
ever, there is one allegation made by re-
spondent touching on his claim to part 
of the proceeds which is of importance. 
This allegation is to the effect that respond-
ent expended the sum of $1652 for ex-
penses of his wife's last illness and burial 
and that the court should take this element 
into consideration in determining the 
amounts to be distributed to the surviving 
heirs. The prayer of the petition was 
couched in the following language: "That 
the court enter its order distributing the 
$11,250.00, together with interest thereon, 
to the respondent as the surviving husband 
and to the two surviving infants, taking in-
to consideration the expenditures made by 
respondent and the physical and mental 
condition of the children/' 
The petition for final distribution and 
the objections thereto came on for hearing 
before the court below. The trial judge 
originally confined the testimony to the 
issues pleaded but as the trial progressed 
and the breach between the litigants wid-
ened the issues became vagrant and wan-
dering. While the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law deal with the first and 
:;i:ai accouiii: of appellant and the distribu-
tion of the funds remaining in his posses-
sion they contain many statements ano. 
conclusions which might be very material 
in a subsequent and properly pleaded action 
to remove appellant as administrator, but 
for the purposes of this suit are far out-
side the framework of the pleadings. We 
make this observation not in any way of 
criticism but only so the parties will know 
whv we do not relate all of the facts touch-
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ing on appellant's improper handling of the 
funds after he was informed respondent 
was contemplating legal action. 
Discarding what we believe to be im-
material, there remain four important ques-
tions to be answered: (1) Did the trial 
court err in holding that proceed? obtained 
fr-'in third pernor.- :" - . « - • ' * ' •'• ^hs 
^r~ ..^ w ^.wv/ibuted tu ;!*<- _jr\:v;::^ ncirs 
in the same proportions as are the assets 
of an estate in the absence of a will? 
(2) Did the court err in holding respond-
ent's anticipated portion of the recovery 
was not assignable? (3) If so, did the 
court err in holding the assignment was 
void because of fraud, champerty and no 
consideration? And (4) Did the court err 
in directing the clerk of the court to pay 
respondent's counsel a stated attorney's 
fee? We treat the questions in the order 
stated. 
This appears to be the first time this 
court has been presented with the neces-
sity of determining the appropriate dis-
tribution to heirs of the proceeds realized 
from a claim for wrongful death. Gen-
erally speaking there are two methods used 
by courts when making such a distribution. 
The first is in accordance with the particu-
lar statutes on descent and distribution in 
probate proceedings. The second is by a 
proportional method, the proportion being 
determined by the loss suffered by each 
heir. We adopt the latter method. 
Section 104—3—11, U.C.A.1943, insofar 
as pertinent, provides as follows: " * * * 
when the death of a person not a minor is 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his heirs, or his personal repre-
sentatives for the benefit of his heirs, may 
maintain an action for damages against 
the person causing the death. * * * In 
every action under this and the next pre-
ceding section such damages may be given 
as under all the circumstances of the case 
may be just." 
[1] In keeping with the provisions of 
this section, suit can be instituted either 
by the heirs themselves or by the personal 
representative of the deceased for the bene-
fit of the heirs. The wording of this sec-
tion compels a conclusion that the legis-
lature intended that the proceeds obtained 
from the wrongdoer would not be inter-
mingled with other assets of the estate 
of the deceased. Otherwise, the cause of 
action would have been vested in the per-
sonal representative alone and the amount 
recovered would have been subjected to 
administration :>y him m the sam • ma:.r.«jr 
For many years this court has confirmed 
the principle that the statutory beneficiaries 
take separate and apart from the estate. 
The funds may pass through the hands of 
the personal representative but the cause 
of action is a new cause which runs direct-
ly to the heirs. In Morrison v. Perry, 104 
Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, 780, we said: 
" * * * Under our wrongful death stat-
ute, 104—3—11, R.S.U.1933, the law does 
not seek to punish the wrongdoer, but 
simply to compensate the heirs for the 
loss sustained. (Citing cases.) It ;s un-
disputed in the evidence that deceased's 
widow paid 5819.40 for funeral services 
and that this amount was reasonable. 
There is, however, no evidence that the 
estate was insolvent, nor was there evi-
dence to show whether or not the widow 
made a claim against the estate for reim-
bursement, or whether or not she was in 
fact reimbursed from the estate. If the 
widow was reimbursed from the estate was 
she damaged in this particular? The an-
swer is obviously no, if we keep in mind 
that the estate is separate and distinct from 
the plaintiff or the statutory beneficiaries 
in this action. The estate may be damaged 
to that extent but the estate is not a party 
under our death statute. (Citing cases.) 
* * * This court in the case of Mason 
v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 
P. 796, held that the death statute, 10-1—3— 
11, of the R.S.U.1933, was not a survival 
statute but that it created a new cause of 
action in the heirs.'* (Italics added.) 
Again in the recent case of Van Wagon-
er v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., Utah, 186 P.2d 
293, 303, the rule is in the following lan-
guage: "Appellants rely on the cases of 
Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 
24 P. 796, and Hailing v. Industrial Com-
mission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78, which, in 
substance, hold that a claim for death is 
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a separate and independent cause of action proceeds should be divided. Besides the S 
and is not a continuation of the right of 
action of the injured party for personal 
injuries. The death creates a new cause of 
action for the loss suffered by the heirs 
by reason of death, and only comes into 
existence upon the happening of death." 
Appellant in effect concedes this rule but 
directs our attention to the wording of 
Section 104—3—11, U.C.A.1943, supra, and 
particularly the phrase "for the benefit 
of his heirs." He contends that even 
though the estate may not be interested 
in the recovery, still the personal repre-
sentative brings the action for all heirs 
and the wording of the section indicates 
^ legislative intent to have the heirs bene-
m to the same extent and in the same 
proportion as they inherit under the pro-
bate code. This argument loses much of 
its force when all parts of the section are 
considered and the elements of damages re-
coverable in a death suit are given weight. 
The section provides that the damages re-
coverable are those which under all the 
circumstances may be just. If we were 
to consider the immediate family as a unit, 
under appellant's theory, each heir would 
suffer damages in the same proportion as 
he receives under the probate code. Such 
a division might permit an heir who suf-
fered little to recover a Mibstannal Mim 
and conversely require an heir who had 
suffered a great deal to accept a mere pit-
tance. In some instances the statutory 
division might accurately reflect the rela-
tive damages suffered. But in many in-
stances it would not and in those instances 
great injustices would be the resiiit. 
It is no answer XO S3X Cijat injustices 
exist in the statutory m«thod.V distributing 
estates. The legislature in providing for 
succession in th^ £&s*n,C<e. o f a will pre-
scribed for distribution without regard to 
1 sse? suffered by the ind:\iJu. 1 he:r-\ ' ;•: 
::: wrun^fii death cascb a uifteix::: nu:n<> 
is imphec. which has a tendency to elimi-
nate some of the claimed unfairness of 
the succession statutes. 
Perhaps if we enumerate some of the 
elemei^ts of damages that can be recovered 
in wrongful death cases we will get a 
better picture of the manner in which the 
financial support furnished by deceased to 
his or her family, the loss of affection, 
counsel and advice, the loss of deceased's 
care and solicitude for the welfare of his 
or her family and the loss of the comfort 
and pleasure the family of the deceased 
would have received are all matters to be 
considered in assessing damages recover-
able under 104—3—11, U.C.A.1943. Pool v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 7 Utah 303, 26 P. 654; 
Evans v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.. 37 
Utah 431, 103 V. 638, Ann.Cas.l912C, 259; 
Chilton v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 8 Utah 
47, 29 P. 963. 
[2] The ultimate would be to distribute 
to each heir a share which would be in 
exact proportion to the loss each had suf-
fered. This is not possible of accurate as-
certainment but the individual's losses can 
be determined within reasonable limits and 
relative proportions fixed. To distribute 
the fund in proportion to the losses suffered 
makes the allocation more consonant with 
the underlying theory of damages. In cer-
tain instances a trial judge might conclude 
that the distribution provided for by the 
statutes of descent and distribution closely 
approximate the losses suffered by the heirs 
and make distribution on that basis. But 
we see no good reason why he should be 
su limited in all cases. 
[3] While the trial judge announced 
sound principles we do not believe he ap-
plied them correctly in this case. We 
quote the conclusion of law adopted in the 
court below. "That because of the fact 
that Edward C. Behm does not require or 
need any of the recovery and because of 
the condition of arrested development and 
the needs of the minor children, to-wit: 
Venna Julene Behm and Darlene Behm, 
the said Edward C. Behm is not entitled 
to any order awarding him part of said 
r^j • r\. V . - :.:^ u-« »1 :>y :^e •: u *: 
i\ - c '::C' -: :: .."-j only ^;_rt of the 
appropriate ones. We have already dis-
cussed in detail some of the elements which 
determine the damages suffered and the 
corresponding distribution co the one who 
has been damaged. It may be that re-
spondent's loss is considerably less than the 
minor daughters' but a surviving husband's 
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actual damages cannot be reduced to such 
an extent that he fails to get any awarcf. 
Respondent pleaded and proved that he 
paid approximately $1600 for expenses of 
the last illness and burial purposes. The 
record establishes that the deceased left no 
estate and consequently respondent was 
required to pay these expenses without any 
possibility of recovering them from her 
estate. These were part of the damages 
alleged in the death suit and must have 
been considered when settlement was made. 
Under the rule announced in the case of 
Morrison v. Perry, supra, respondent was 
at the least entitled to recover the amount 
expended for burial expenses and we be-
lieve that when he is by statute made legal-
ly liable for expenses of the last illness 
the same principle should apply. To reduce 
his interest in the recovery below the 
amount he so expended would deny him 
the right to recover the sum he was legally 
required to pay as a result of the wrong-
doer's negligence. 
[4] We conclude that respondent's por-
tion of the death claim is assignable. 
Respondent's contention is that such a hold-
ing would overrule those cases in which 
this court had held that a cause of action 
for wrongful death is non-assignable. Had 
respondent attempted to assign a cause of 
action for death then the cases cited would 
have been controlling. However, appellant 
assigned not the cause of action, but rath-
er, assigned any interest he might have in 
the recovery. While at first blush this 
may appear to be a distinction without a 
difference, upon closer examination it be-
comes apparent that there is a real and 
substantial difference. The cause of ac-
tion cannot be split up between the heirs 
but the amount recovered can be and is. 
The problem thus presented is this. Can 
an heir, after a cause of action has arisen 
in which he has an interest make an as-
signment of his interest? 
Much has been said by courts in the past 
regarding the assignability and non-assign-
ability of contingent interests at law and 
in equity. Lawr courts originally refused 
to recognize assignments of contingent in-
terests of any kind. Later, because of the 
Chancellor's liberal enforcement of such 
assignments, the judges presiding in courts 
of law agreed to uphold assignments of 
contingent interests having a potential re-
alization at the time of the assignment. 
Modern courts, however, have adopted 
the more liberal equitable rule enforcing 
assignments of things not in esse but mere 
iuture possibilities so lone r.s the assign-
ments are fairly made i~: _;: _; .-quate 
consideration without offending against 
public policy. Thus assignments of future 
contractual interests, anticipated interests 
in real or personal property, future wages 
or the expectancy of an heir in the estate 
of an ancestor have all been repeatedly 
upheld by modern decisions. 
[5] Courts have adopted the same rule 
where one who has sustained personal in-
juries assigns such proceeds as may pos-
sibly be recovered by him in an action 
brought against the tort-feasor. Moreover, 
a court of equity will enforce the assign-
ment even though the cause of action is 
not assignable. Richard v. National Trans-
portation Co., 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 
870; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ackley, 
58 Ul.App. 572, reversed on other grounds, 
171 111. 100, 49 N.E. 222, 44 L.R.A. 177; 
Hutchinson v. Brown, 8 App.D.C. 157; 
Schubert v. Herzberg, 65 Mo.App. 578; 
Pittsburg, C , C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Vol-
kert, 58 Ohio St. 362, 50 N.E. 924. In the 
first cited case, the injured person assigned 
to a hospital a share of any proceeds he 
should acquire from any settlement or judg-
ment to be paid by the tort-feasor. The 
court recognized that under the law of the 
state of New York the cause of action 
was non-assignable, but held that the as-
signment of a share of the proceeds was 
enforceable in equity: The court said [158 
Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 872] : 
"Unless prohibited by public policy or 
statute, the paper signed by McManus was 
a valid assignment of the proceeds. The 
fact that at the time the instrunent was 
executed all that the assignor posseted was, 
a chose in action—a cause of a c tnn^S? 
personal injuries—did not in itself render 
the assignment of the proceeds an ab:olute 
nullity. 
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"The existence of the cause of action petition as originally drawn, or as amend-
gave a potential existence to the proceeds; 
the potential existence of the proceeds 
gave an equitable existence to the assign-
ment. 
" The fact that there was no fund then 
in existence, or any claim which could then 
be enforced by action, did not prevent the 
instrument taking effect as an equitable 
assignment.' * * * 
"To rule that I cannot assign the cause 
of action, but that I can transfer 100 per 
cent, of its proceeds sounds anomalous. It 
is tantamount to saying that I can transfer 
the substance but must retain the shell; 
that I can give you the right to the re-
covery, but I must hold the right to recover. 
"However, repeated precedents of many 
years' standing tell us this is the law. 
• * *" (Italics added.) 
Under the rules announced, the assign-
ment by respondent of the proceeds, if 
any, that should be recovered from the 
malpractice suit instituted by appellant, is 
valid and enforceable. 
• [6] The trial court's general finding of 
fraud cannot be sustained. It is extremely 
doubtful that the allegations of the petition 
are sufficient to raise this issue. But assum-
ing they are, the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain any such finding. Any evidence 
suggesting misconduct on the part of appel-
lant covers activities during the period sub-
sequent to the assignment. We mention 
this assignment of error merely because 
of a rinding by the trial judge that he found 
generally all issues of fact in favor of re-
spondent and against appellant. Undoubt-
edly as a result of this finding both parties 
have argued this issue before this court. 
[7, 8] We are unable to sustain the trial 
court's conclusion that the assignment was 
void because champertous. This issue was 
ed, and there should be evidence to support 
them. 
[9] Respondent's contention that there 
was no consideration for the assignment is 
not sustained by the record. By statute, 
respondent was entitled to be appointed ad-
ministrator of his wife's estate and could 
institute the action in this representative 
capacity. He was also entitled to be ap-
pointed guardian of the estates of his two 
daughters. Appellant was not required to 
assume the burden of either appointment. 
There were no assets of the estate or of 
the guardianships other than the claim 
against the doctor and apparently respond-
ent was not disposed to become the active 
party in prosecuting a suit of such doubt-
ful value. Whether or not he was unwill-
ing to risk his time or money or both for 
such a purpose does not appear. But there 
can be no question but what he was per-
fectly willing to permit his father-in-law 
to assume the burden, finance the litigation 
and take all the risks. The record con-
clusively establishes that appellant spent 
some time and some money in prosecuting 
the action with beneficial results. Maybe 
the expenditures were not large but the in-
vestment was made without assurance of 
any return. Moreover, they directly bene-
fit respondent whether he obtains posses-
sion of any money now or whether it is 
subsequently expended for the benefit of 
his daughters. Appellant performed serv-
ices for the benefit of respondent which 
he, appellant, was not legally liable to do, 
and it does not lie in the mouth of respond-
ent to say that the detriments suffered by 
appellant were so insignificant that they 
will not support the assignment of a claim 
which respondent considered of little or no 
value. 
F101 The award of attornev's fees is 
sun.Cient establish 
Even after a discussion in court that the 
question might be of importance, no re-
quest was made to amend the pleading so 
as to place it in issue. While we liberally 
construe pleadings, the findings as made 
should be within the framework of the 
individuals who might be interested in the 
fund: Appellant, respondent, and the two 
infant daughters. However, only three can 
recover as heirs, or heirs and assignee. Re-
spondent was denied any recovery by the 
trial court unless the attorney's fees be 
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considered as an award to him. Assuming 
the minors have had their interests in-
creased by the trial court's ruling that re-
spondent should not prevail, their estates 
should not be depleted to finance respond-
ent's suit to recover his claimed portion 
of the fund. The an: eilant cannot he 
char.;-- 1 v/ith the fees >o that either re-
spondent was given a partial recovery or 
the court had in mind charging the es-
tate. To charge the estate would be in-
consistent with the court's ruling that the 
proceeds go to the heirs and do not become 
assets of the estate. Moreover, the estate 
has not been benefited as this litigation is 
over distribution of the assets. The estate 
should not bear the burden of litigation 
between distributees. See In re Yonk's Es-
tate, Utah, 204 P.2d 452. The award can-
not be sustained as being a charge against 
respondent's portion as this is hostile to the 
finding that he was not entitled to partici-
pate. 
[11] Respondent now asserts that he is 
not complaining because the court failed 
to award him a part of the recovery and 
that appellant is not a party who can com-
plain. This assertion hardly warrants an-
swering. An assignor cannot depreciate 
the assignment by merely saying he does 
not want the fund he assigned and the as-
signee can complain if he is denied re-
covery on his assignment. 
The trial judge in his disposition of the 
cause attempted to conserve the maximum 
amount of the estate for the infant sur-
vivors and this should be the objective of 
all parties to this litigation. Much as we 
might like to accomplish this desirable re-
sult, except in those cases where the evi-
dence shows that a husband did not suffer 
any damage, pecuniary or otherwise, we 
cannot deny him his right to participate in 
the recovery. Accordingly, the judgment 
must be reversed. 
[12] In a retrial the trial judge should 
determine the relative loss suffered by the 
three heirs and provide for distribution on 
a proportionate basis. Respondent's por-
tion should be awarded to appellant. The 
amount awarded should be in full settle-
ment of all claims by appellant including 
any claim he may assert for services in 
his representative capacity. 
Reversed. Costs to appellant. 
PRATT, C. J., and WOLFE, WADE 
<\nd McDOXOlXH, J J., concur. 
BEHM'S ESTATE et al. v. GEE. 
No. 7333. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 20, 1050. 
Proceeding in the matter of the guard-
ianship of the estate of Venna Julene Behm 
and Cheryl Darlene Behm, on petition of Ed-
ward C. Behm that Alma Gee, guardian, be 
removed. 
The guardian made a motion to dismiss 
the petition, and the Third Judicial District 
Court, Clarence E. Baker, J., entered a judg-
ment removing the guardian, and the guard-
ian appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Latimer, J., held that, 
since the matter was pending on a motion to 
dismiss, judgment of removal was prema-
turely made. 
Judgment reversed with directions to per-
mit the guardian to file appropriate plead-
ings if he so elects. 
1. Guardian and ward C=>25 
Where there was a petition that guard-
ian be removed and guardian made a mo-
tion to dismiss the petition, removal of 
guardian was error even if there was an 
admission showing that guardian did not 
properly appreciate his duties as trustee, 
and the only appropriate order that could 
have been entered was one denying the mo-
tion to dismiss and granting the guardian 
a reasonable time to answer. U.C.A.1943, 
102—6—1. 
2. Guardian and ward <S=*25 
The court may remove a guardian at 
any time upon a proper showing, irrespec-
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with provisions of the Employment Security 
Law, and those provisions which treat real 
estate salesmen as employees for purposes of 
the real estate laws should not be construed 
as making them employees for purposes of 
the unemployment laws. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY OF WYOMING, a corporation, 
and Becky Boehler, Appellants (Defendants 
below), 
v. 
Donald B. FINKBINER, Harold R. Flnkbln-
er, and Dorothy E. MacDougall, Ap-
pellees (Plaintiffs below). 
Oonald B. FINKBINER. Harold R. Finkbin-
er, and Dorothy E. MacDougall, Ap-
pellants (Plaintiffs below), 
v. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY OF WYOMING, a corporation, 
and Becky Boehler, Appellees (Defendants 
below). 
Nos. 3458, 3459. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
July 1, 196& 
Declaratory judgment action for con-
struction of provisions of trust brought 
by remaindermen against trustee and life 
beneficiary of trust. The District Court, 
Laramie County, Rodney N. Guthrie, J., 
rendered judgments interpreting the trust 
The trustee and life beneficiary and re-
mainderman appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Gray, J., held, inter alia, that requirement 
by trial court that trustee investigate and 
determine extent to which principal of trust 
created by husband for benefit of wife 
should be invaded so that payments of prin-
cipal would not result in increase of wife's 
personal estate was improper because re-
quirement fixed amount of payments to 
be made in future by standard not imposed 
upon trustee by grantor. 
Judgment affirmed as modified. 
1. Trusts <3=>M9 
Trust instrument that gave trustee 
power in its sole discretion to advance to 
wife oi grantor from rime :o 'line such por-
tions of the principal of said trust fund as 
in its judgment may be necessary for her 
proper care and support was ambiguous 
and grantor's will and codicil should have 
been admitted in declaratory judgment ac-
tion brought by remaindermen of trust for 
construction of trust instrument to show 
surrounding circumstances at time trust 
was created. 
2. Appeal and Error €=1056(5) 
Exclusion of grantor's will and codicil 
from evidence in trust remaindermen's de-
claratory judgment action to construe in-
vasion clause of trust instrument was not 
prejudicial to remaindermen where trial 
court gave consideration to circumstances 
surrounding the creation of trust in con-
struction and interpretation of trust. 
3. Trusts Q=>\ 12, 276 
In interpreting trust and determining 
powers of trustee to invade principal for 
benefit of life beneficiary, intent of grantor 
is controlling. 
4. Trusts <S=»276 
Grantor's intention in granting power 
to trustee to invade principal for benefit 
of life beneficiary is to be ascertained, it 
possible, from the context of the trust in-
strument as a whole. 
5. Trusts <&=II2 
Every word of trust is to be given ef-
fect if that can be done without defeating 
general purpose of the trust. 
6. Trusts <3=>II8 
If intention of grantor does not readily 
appear from trust instrument, language used 
is to be read in light of surrounding cir-
cumstances at time trust was executed. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. TINKBINER Wyo. 2 2 5 
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7. T r u s t * <S=M 12 
Narrow and unreasonable construction 
of trust that would defeat the purpose in-
tended by the grantor will not be adopted. 
ft. Trusts<S=>ll2 
Once ascertained, trust grantor's in-
tention in creation of trust must govern, 
provided result reached is not contrary to 
law. 
% Trusts € » l 12 
$[ Provisions of trust treated by husband 
Siat conferred benefits upon his wife are 
JO be construed liberally in her behalf. 
10. Trusts <S=»276 
Husband's purpose in creating trust 
for benefit of wife with power in trustee 
JO invade principal "for her proper care 
tnd support" was to assure that bis wife 
vould not have to rely solely on income of 
rust and property left her by will for her 
iupport. 
f l . T rus ts <S=>276 
Grant of power to trustee in its sole 
iiscretion to advance to wife of the grantor 
Tom time to time such portions of the prin-
:ipal of said trust fund as in its judgment 
nay be necessary for her proper care and 
iupport and in the exercise of discretion 
he trustee "shall be liable to no one" was 
'rant of broad powers to trustee to adminis-
er trust limited only to extent that trustee 
vould not employ its discretion recklessly or 
n a manner that would frustrate the gran-
or's intent. 
% Trusts <&»276 
Grant of power to trustee to invade 
irincipai of trust created by husband for 
icncfit of wife "as may be necessary for 
ter proper care and support" did not re-
iuire the trustee to inquire into wife's as-
ets and that her assets be exhausted in 
rhole or in part before payments could be 
lade from principal. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
I. To avoid confusion we shall usually he 
416 P.2d—15 
13. Trusts <S=>276 
Requirement by trial court that trustee 
investigate and determine extent to which 
principal of trust created by husband for 
benefit of wife should be invaded so that 
payments of principal would not result in 
increase of wife's personal estate was im-
proper because it fixed amount of payments 
to be made in future by standard not im-
posed upon trustee by grantor. 
14. Trusts 4=3278 
Power granted to trustee to "advance" 
to wife of grantor from time to time por-
tions of the principal of the trust fund was 
authority for trustee to pay such amounts 
ta grantor's wife and not direction that 
trustee make loans to beneficiary. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett and 
Frederick G. Loomis, Cheyenne, for appel-
lants and appellees. 
Kline & Tilker and Arthur Kline, Chey-
enne, for appellees and appellants. 
Before PARKER, C. J., and HARNS-
BERGER, GRAY, and McINTYRE, JJ. 
Mr. Justice GRAY delivered the opinion 
of the court. 
Plaintiffs, as the remaindermen of an in-
ter vivos trust, commenced an action for a 
declaratory judgment and other relief 
against the bank, as trustee, and against 
Becky Boehler,1 as the life beneficiary, 
claiming that the trustee was administer-
ing" the trust in violation of the rights of 
:he remaindermen. The nasis of plaintiffs' 
claim to a large extent is dependent upon 
the power conferred upon the trustee by 
a provision in the trust authorizing the trus-
tee to invade principal for the proper care 
and support of Becky. The joint answer 
and counterclaim of the defendants also 
requested the court to construe such pro-
vision and determine the rights, duties, and 
legal relation of all the parties to the ac-
:after refer to this defendant as "Becky." 
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tion. The judgment entered by the trial 
court failed in certain respects to satisfy 
either the plaintiffs or the defendants and 
as a consequence both parties have ap-
pealed. 
The facts essential to a general under-
standing of the controversy are not in dis-
pute. The trust was created in the year 
1929 by John Huckfeldt. Becky was his 
wife. They had married in the \ear 1918. 
Turning to the pertinent provisions of the 
trust instrument, we discover it was first 
directed that the net income of the trust 
should be paid to Becky. It was then pro-
vided that upon her death the accumulated 
income and principal were to be paid to his 
sister, Alma Finkbiner, and in the event 
of her death prior to termination of the 
trust the proceeds were to be distributed to 
her surviving children, who are now the 
plaintiffs and the remaindermen. It was 
further provided, and this is the provision 
forming the crux of the controversy, that: 
"The power is hereby given the Trustee 
in its sole discretion to advance to the 
wife of the Grantor from time to time 
such portions of the principal of the said 
trust fund as in its judgment may be 
necessary for her proper care and sup-
port, and the Trustee jn so doing is wholly 
protected and shall be liable to no one." 
Grantor also reserved the right to amend 
or revoke the trust during his lifetime. 
The trust was funded in the year 1936, 
upon the death of grantor. The principal 
received by the trustee was in the sum of 
$35,405.32. In addition to the benefits con-
ferred by the trust and also as a result of 
the death of her husband, Becky received 
83 shares of American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company stock, the proceeds of life 
insurance policies in the sum of $14,000, and 
the proceeds of a joint checking account 
in the approximate sum of $4,000. The home 
in which the couple resided was in the name 
of Becky. 
The trustee from the year 1936 to 1952 
made monthly payments to Becky in 
amounts varying from $130 to $200 per 
month, which were made up of income and 
principal. While there was testimony 
the trustee was conversant with Becky's 
financial affairs and gave consideration 
to such matters during that period, it did 
not regard its powers to invade principal 
as limited to bare necessities of Becky after 
taking into strict account her income from 
other sources or to require her to exhaust 
or use her own personal estate for pur-
poses of support. Consequently, no special 
effort was made to require Becky regularly 
to report her income and expenses and to 
account for the expenditure of amounts 
paid to her by the trustee. 
In 1952 Becky married Leonard Boeh-
ler. At the time of the marriage Boeh-
ler was a man of modest means and because 
of physical disability had not been employed 
for some time. His only income for the past 
several years has been a small social se-
curity payment. On the occasion of Becky's 
remarriage, Alma Finkbiner made inquiry 
of the trustee as to the payments being made 
to Becky from the trust. Upon being in-
formed that the trustee had been invading 
principal in order to make the monthly pay-
ments of $200, Mrs. Finkbiner, through her 
attorney, advised the trustee that further 
invasion of principal under the circum-
stances then existing was unwarranted and 
was in fact contrary to the provisions of 
the trust. In view of the complaint and in 
view of the changed circumstances, the 
trustee made a reappraisal of the entire 
situation. The matter was also referred to 
its attorney. Thereafter, the trustee con-
cluded that a monthly payment of $162.50 
to Becky from the trust—in part from in-* ^ 
come and in part from principal—was nec-
essary for her reasonable care and support 
and payments in such amount have been 
made since that time. Becky did not object. 
Mrs. Finkbiner was also advised of the de-
cision by the trustee but took no action be-
fore her death in November 1962. For the 
period between August 1, 1936 and January 
29, 1965, the trustee paid to Becky out of 
the principal of the trust approximately 
$23,000. Of that amount approximately 
$13,500 has been paid since the remarriage 
of Becky. The balance of the principal re-
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maining in the trust after making said pay-
ments was approximately $12,000. 
The action here was commenced in April 
1963. In substance, the contentions of 
plaintiffs below were that the intention of 
the grantor was that the principal* of the 
trust was to remain intact for the remain-
dermen except invasion for amounts neces-
sary for Becky's proper care and support; 
that it was not intended that the principal 
be used to enhance the value of Becky's 
personal estate; that the advances made 
by the trustee were not necessary for 
Becky's care and support; that because of 
the remarriage Becky was not entitled to 
further advances; that the trustee had been 
cSareless and negligent in the administra-
tion of the trust; and that the payments 
made from principal by the trustee were 
simply "advances" in the nature of loans 
"from the trust and had to be restored. The 
relief sought was a determination of the 
rights of the parties under the trust agree-
ment, an order restraining the trustee from 
further invasion of principal, and that the 
trustee be required to restore to principal 
the funds paid to Becky from that source. 
As we understand plaintiffs' brief, this de-
mand has now been modified to embrace 
only the payments made subsequent to 
Becky's remarriage. 
The contentions of the defendants were 
that Becky was the primary interest of 
grantor in creating the trust; that the trus-
tee had absolute discretion to invade the 
principal in such amount as in its judgment 
was necessary for Becky's proper care and 
support and could be held accountable only 
for failure to exercise its discretion in good 
faith; that such discretion, is not subject 
to control by the court except for abuse; 
that ' c' :~g its discretion it need not 
consider Becky's other financial means, or 
in the alternative that it need only consider 
Becky's other income; and that the pay-
Oients made to Becky from principal were 
Within the trustee's discretion. By their 
answer and counterclaim the defendants 
Asked that the court determine the rights 
•Of the parties in keeping with their conten-
tions and that plaintiffs' claims for relief 
be denied. 
The trial court in disposing of the mat-
ter held that the trust instrument was not 
ambiguous and the intention of grantor 
could be determined from the four corners 
of the instrument; that the trustee did not 
have absolute discretion in the invasion of 
principal for Becky's care and support; that 
Becky was not required to exhaust her per-
sonal estate in order to receive payment 
of principal; that the trustee before in-
vading principal must take into considera-
tion the other income of Becky and her hus-
band so that payments of principal will not 
result in an increase of Becky's personal 
estate; that the word ^advance" for pur-
poses of the trust means "pay"; that Becky's 
remarriage did not affect her status as the 
life beneficiary; tfiat the trustee has not 
been negligent in its administration of the 
trust, has acted in good faith, and has not 
abused its discretion; and that defendants 
were not liable to the remaindermen and 
neither the trustee nor Becky are required 
to reimburse principal. The trial court also 
directed the trustee to investigate and re-
determine the extent to which the princi-
pal should be invaded, taking care that such 
payments when added to Becky's other in-
come would sufficiently enable her to main-
tain her present station in life and yet not 
increase the corpus of her personal estate. 
On appeal the plaintiffs in substance con-
tend that the judgment of the trial court 
was in error except that portion which de-
termined the trustee was required to con-
sider Becky's other income before invading 
principal. The defendants in substance con-
tend that the trial court erred in holding 
certain extrinsic evidence inadmissible be-
c use the trust instrument was not am-
biguous and in declining to consider other 
evidence of surrounding circumstances; in 
holding that the trustee's discretion to in-
vade principal for the purpose stated was 
not absolute; and in directing the trustee 
to exercise its discretion in the manner 
above set forth. 
From the foregoing it is quite evident 
that inquiry into the powers of the trustee is 
not only essential, but to a large extent will 
dispose of the questions raised on both 
appeals. 
[1,2] In approaching the question of 
interpretation of the clause granting the 
power of invasion of the principal, we will 
first state that we would like to agree with 
the trial court's conclusion that such clause, 
when considered v/ith r.thzr provisions of 
the trust, was not ambiguous. Unfortunate-
ly, we cannot go that far. The great 
volume of litigation prompted by clauses 
similar to the one here and the struggle 
courts have with those clauses in order to 
arrive at the intention of the grantor 
demonstrate the ambiguity. Usually, the 
divergence in results reached can be at-
tributed in a large measure to the circum-
stances surrounding the creation of the 
trust. For an informative discussion of 
the matter see 2 Scott on Trusts, § 164.1, 
pp. 1156-1160 (2d Ed.). Consequently, we 
think there is merit in defendants* conten-
tion that competent evidence tending to 
show surrounding circumstances was ad-
missible and was entitled to consideration. 
That is particularly true of grantor's will 
executed on the same date as the trust in-
strument and the codicil thereto executed 
in the year 1934. In this connection we 
should mention, that the codicil was one 
item of evidence which the trial court re-
fused to admit in evidence. Such a ruling, 
it seems to us, overlooks the fact that the 
trust was not funded at the time the codicil 
was executed and the grantor had reserved 
the right to amend or revoke the trust at 
any time. The codicil was therefore rele-
vant as a part of the overall plan adopted 
by John Huckfeldt for disposing of his 
property and such plan does have some 
significance as an aid to construing the 
invasion clause. Nevertheless, we do not 
find that the trial court's rulings on these 
matters were prejudicial. With one ex-
ception, which we shall later mention, we 
are of the opinion that the trial court prop-
erly disposed of the questions before it 
and the exception can be corrected her 
without invading the province of the trijj 
court as the finder of the facts. Furthei 
more, the trial court, as shown by its memc 
randum opinion, did give consideration t 
the surrounding circumstances in arrivin 
at certain of its conclusions. 
In meeting the difficult problem of it 
terpreting the invasion clause of the trui 
in order to arrive at the intention of th 
grantor, we have been substantially aide 
by the thoroughness with which counsel fc 
both parties in their.briefs have present* 
and analyzed the authorities in connectio 
therewith. As stated by counsel for tl 
plaintiffs, the cases, for convenience, ca 
be viewed as falling into three generi 
classes, namely, (1) those holding that tr 
trustee must inquire into the assets ar 
resources of the life beneficiary and n 
quire that they be exhausted in whole or i 
part before payments are made from tl 
principal, (2) those holding that the trust< 
need consider only the other income of tl 
life beneficiary—not his assets, and (I 
those holding that the trust was intended : 
provide for the needs of the beneficiary ar 
was a complete benefaction in itself ai 
that the trustee need not inquire into eith< 
the assets or income of the life beneficiar 
To the three classes mentioned, despi 
overlapping, should be added a four 
classification, ana it is composed of tho 
cases advanced by counsel for the defen 
ants interpreting a clause containing la 
guage similar to the clause here as vestii 
in the trustee an absolute or unlimited di 
cretion which is not subject to control 1 
the courts except to prevent abuse. Se 
eral cases hold that subject to such limit 
tion the trustee is free to consider or n 
consider a life beneficiary's other financi 
means. 
While a review of the authorities suppoi 
ing the approach taken by the courts in t 
four classes of cases enumerated has be 
informative, an effort on our part 
analyze and reconcile the divergent resu 
reached would seem unrewarding. Becau 
of the variance in the language of t 
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luse being interpreted and the differing 
rrounding circumstances present in each 
>e, reliance on precedents has its limita-
ns. In re Tuthill's Will, 247 Minn. 122, 
N.W.2d 499, 502; and Annotation 2 
L.R2d 1383, 1431. Seldom is it possible 
itly to package an invasion clause into a 
-ticular class and say that it is controlled 
some categorical general rule. Cer-
ily that is true of this case, particularly 
to the language used. Except as to its 
teral tenor, it seems almost unique. 
vertheless, we shall proceed as best we 
[ to interpret.the clause, keeping in mind 
pful and well-recognized rules of con-
iction. 
3-8] A* we have heretofore indicated^ 
i the intention of the granior that must 
em. That is to be ascertained, if poasi~ 
from the context of the trust instru-
tt as a whole. Every word is to be given 
£t if that can be done without defeating 
general purpose of the trust. In re 
urn's Estate, Wyo., 406 P2d 655, 658. 
he intention of the grantor does not 
lily appear from the instrument, then 
language used is to be read in the light 
he surrounding circumstances. In re 
lill's Will, supra; In re Worman's 
te, 231 Iowa 1351, 4 N.W.2d 373, 374; 
ed States Trust Co. of New York v. 
s, 414 111. 265, 111 N.E.2d 144, 147-
A narrow and unreasonable con-
:tion that would defeat the purpose in-
*d by the grantor will not be adopted. 
) ascertained, the intention must gov-
provided that the result reached is not 
ary to law. In re Ogburn's Estate, 
i. 
| It is also a well-recogrnized rule that 
irovisions of a husband's will or of a 
created by him conferring benefits 
his wife are to be construed liberal-
her behalf. Bradberry v. Anderson, 
kla. 681, 200 So. 762, 763; In re Wor-
Estate, supra; Arenofsky v. Arenof-
9 NJ.Super. 209, 102 A.2d 101, 106; 
In re Leonard's Estate, 115 Vt. 440, 63 A.2d 
179, 181. 
[10] Our first inquiry here can well be 
directed to the general purpose John Huck-
f eldt had in mind in creating the t rust As 
to this the trial court upon consideration of 
the instrument as a whole and the surround-
ing circumstances, as disclosed by its memo-
randum opinion, concluded that the primary 
purpose was to assure that Becky would be 
supported in a "proper manner" without 
having to rely solely "upon the income from 
this trust and the property he left her." 
W e agree with the conclusion, subject to 
some refinement. As the trial court ob-
servedj the remaindermen were "collateral 
relatives" and the "primary object of the 
bounty of the settlor*' was hi i wife, Becky. 
True; there was evidence from which the 
trial court might have inferred that because 
of a special and friendly relationship exist-
ing between the grantor and the remainder-
men, the grantor intended that the principal 
of the trust be preserved for the remainder-
men to the deprivation of liberality on 
Becky's behalf, but we cannot say that such 
was the only inference to be drawn. Per-
haps it was this relationship that prompted 
grantor to select his sister or her issue 
as residuary beneficiaries rather than to 
include his other relatives. In any event, 
there was ample evidence to sustain the 
view that grantor and Becky had led the 
"good life," as the trial court put it, and 
that her welfare was his principal concern. 
There remains, of course, the question of 
the extent to which the principal had been 
devoted to Becky, and we think we can 
best answer that by next considering the 
powers conferred upon the trustee to carry 
[11] The invasion clause has heretofore 
been set forth in full. Without question it 
discloses an intention to grant broad powers 
to the trustee. In substance, with emphasis 
on the dominant words, it authorizes in-
vasion of principal in the "sole discretion" 
of the trustee from "time to time" in such 
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amounts as in its "judgment may be neces-
sary for her proper care and support" and 
in the exercise of such discretion the trus-
tee "shall be liable to no one." No doubt 
the clause is not as artfully drawn as it 
might have been to avoid pitfalls that have 
developed in the law of trusts since 1929. 
Nevertheless, it seems apparent that grantor 
firmly believed that the trustee, in the ex-
ercise of its experience, judgment and dis-
cretion, would so administer the trust as to 
deal fairly with all the beneficiaries in 
carrying out the purpose of the trustee. 
Of course, plaintiffs put that aside as a 
device prompted by the trustee for its pro-
tection, but we think the more reasonable 
view is that it was here inserted to en-
courage untrammeled use of the power. 
Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Dis-
cretionary Trusts, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 1425. 
1433. 
Whether we say it was an absolute dis-
cretion seems unimportant The grant, in 
any event, gave great freedom of action 
to the trustee with the qualification that the 
law places upon it, which is succinctly 
stated in Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 560, 
p. 119 (2d Ed.), to be: 
" * * * that the trustee shall act with 
some regard to the purposes of the trust, 
and not make decisions which frustrate 
the accomplishment of the settlor's in-
tent; and also that he shall employ his 
discretion deliberately and with some 
thought and not recklessly or capriciously, 
and furthermore in a spirit of good faith 
and honesty." 
[12] Plaintiffs do not seem particularly 
to quarrel with that rule but insist that use 
of the words "necessary support" places the 
clause in class one above. They rely on 
cases such as In re Ferrall's Estate, 41 Cal. 
2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009; Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York v. New York City 
Cancer Committee, 145 Conn. 542, 144 A.2d 
535, 537; and In re Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 
305, 199 N.E. 491. For cases to the con-
trary see Winkel v. Streicher, 365 Mo. 1170, 
295 S.W.2d 56, 58-59; In re Clark's Will, 
280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E2d 1001, 1002; anc 
In re Demitc' Estate, 417 Pa. 316, 20* 
A.2d 280, 282. Without indicating our ap-
proval or disapproval of the rationale fol-
lowed in any of these cases, we are dis-
posed to regard plaintiffs' contention aj 
advancing a narrow and unreasonable con-
struction. It overlooks the related genera 
standard of "proper care" prescribed h\ 
the grantor, the broad discretion comY—^ 
upon the trustee, and other pertinent cir-
cumstances^ 
[13] Neither do we think it necessarj 
to pass upoa^fe Question of whether or no! 
the trustee was compelled to give consid 
eration to Becky's other income. The fad 
is that the trustee—with the acquiescence 
of Beck>—whether as a matter of inter 
pretation or as an exercise of discretion 
has from the outset given consideration tc 
such income and the trial court has founc 
from substantial evidence that in so doing 
the trustee has not been guilty of negii 
gence; h^s exercised good faith; and ha< 
not abused its discretion. It also state* 
that other than increment there was nc 
evidence of capital enhancement of Becky'j 
personal estate. We find nothing in th< 
record to indicate that the trustee or Beck} 
at this late date proposes a change of poliq 
in administering the trust, and as a resul 
we think the trial court mipht well hav< 
declined to enter into this unsettled stat< 
of the law, cttn though requested to do so 
The real controversy was with the plain-
tiffs and, as we view it, that controvers) 
was sufficiently settled by the foregoing 
Consequently, we hold that the trial coun 
went too far in directing the trustee to re 
appraise tiie situation "so that payments ol 
principal will not result in an increase oi 
her [Becky's] personal estate." In essence 
such a direction fixed the amount of the 
payments to be made in the future by ai 
illusive standard not imposed upon the 
trustee by die grantor. That was a mattei 
which the grantor left to the discretion oi 
the trustee in the first instance. In re 
Grubel's \Y3,37 Misc.2d 910, 235 N.Y.S2d 
21, 23. 
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[14] Also, we find no merit in plain-
iffs' contention that the trial court erred 
i construing the word "advance" to mean 
pay." As the trial court remarked, the 
lought that amounts paid to Becky from 
rincipal were "repayable" or in the nature 
f a "secured loan" would be "repugnant" 
> the intention of the grantor. The trial 
Wirt's conclusion is well supported by au-
tority. Hichborn v. Bradbury, 111 Me. 
519, 90 A. 325; Martin v. Kimball, 86 N.J. 
Eq. 10, % A. 565, 566, 568, affirmed 86 
NJ.Eq. 432, 99 A. 1070; In re Altman's 
Will, Surr., 6 N.Y.S.2d 972. 
The judgment is modified insofar as it 
undertakes to impose upon the trustee the 
change in policy for future administration 
of the trust. In all other respects the 
judgment is affirmed. 
Affirmed as modified. 
"'[Ajiihough ordinarily an a^pui-nU' 
court will not consider an issue which 
has not been raised in the trial court or 
which has not been raised by the parties 
on appeal, the court does have the power 
to do so in exceptional circumstances, 
where consideration of the new issue is 
necessary to serve the ends of justice or 
to prevent a denial of fundamental 
rights." 
We conclude this case presents exceptional 
circumstances and that remand is neces-
sary to serve the ends of justice. 
The judgment of the district court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded with 
directions to set aside the conviction. 
248 Kan. 975 
J. Richard GODFREY, 
Trustee, Appellee. 
v. 
Peggy CHANDLEY, an incompetent; and 
Sue Moran, Guardian of the Person 
and Estate of Peggy Chandley, Appel-
lants, 
and 
W.T. Chandley; Fay C. Hogle; Martha 
Lou Chandley Haddon; Lee Ellen Ho-
gle Morrison; Janis Ann Hogle Robin-
son; and Linda Fay Hogle, Appellees. 
No. 65630. 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
May 24, 1991. 
Trustee filed declaratory judgment ac-
tion, seeking interpretation and construc-
tion of testamentary trust. The Seward 
District Court, Keaton G. Duckworth, J., 
determined that decedent's widow's income 
from marital estate had to first be applied 
to her cost of living, and only if income 
became insufficient to pay reasonable costs 
of support, health, and maintenance should 
*.r\>t iiicufi.u i.>«- upi-iio*! to such expenses. 
Widow and her guardian appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Herd, J., held that: (1) 
testamentary trust provisions were unam-
biguous, and therefore trial court improper-
ly considered parol evidence in construing 
trust provisions; (2) testamentary trust re-
quired trustee to pay widow's support, 
health, and maintenance for period of her 
natural life irrespective of her individual 
income; (3) upon death of life beneficiary, 
remaindermen, as opposed to life benefi-
ciary- estate, would be entitled to undis-
tributed income; and (4) venue of action to 
construe testamentary trust had to be in 
county where will was filed for probate, as 
opposed to county of trustee's residence. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=842(8) 
Construction of written instrument is 
question of law, and therefore instrument 
may be construed and its legal effect deter-
mined by appellate court. 
2. Contracts <£> 176(2) 
Whether instrument is ambiguous is 
matter of law to be decided by court. 
3. Contracts <s=>143(2) 
Generally, if language of written in-
strument is clear and can be carried out as 
written, there is no room for rules of con-
struction. 
4. Wills <s=*470<2) 
Primary function of court in interpre-
tation of will is to ascertain testator's in-
tent as derived from four corners of will. 
5. Wills <s=>488 
When ambiguity exists in will, parol 
evidence is admissible to ascertain meaning 
of words used. 
6. Trusts <3=>280 
Whether trustee can consider personal 
income of trust beneficiary when making 
distributions is to be determined from lan-
guage of instrument and surrounding cir-
cumstances. 
GODFREY v. CHANDLEY Kan. 1249 
Cite as 811 P2d 1248 (Kan. 1991) 
7. Trusts <3=>273 13. Wills <s=>698 
When trust settlor manifests intention Venue of action to interpret testamen-
that trust property be applied to benefi- tary trust had to be in county where will 
ciary s support only if and to extent benefi-
 w a s fiied for probate, as opposed to county 
ciary is in actual need, then beneficiary is
 o f trustee's residence. K.S.A. 59-1601, 60-
not entitled to support from trust fund if 595 
other sufficient resources are available. 
8. Trusts <s=>119 
When settlor directs trustee to pay 
beneficiary so much as is necessary for his 
support and maintenance, inference arises 
that settlor intended beneficiary to receive 
support from trust estate, regardless of 
other income. 
9. Trusts <3=>119 
Trial court should not have used parol 
evidence as to testator's intent in constru-
ing provisions of testamentary trust, where 
trust provisions were unambiguous, and 
therefore intent could be ascertained solely 
from language of instrument. 
10. Wills <S=>684.10(2) 
Pursuant to testamentary trust, which 
directed that trustee shall pay such portion 
of net income from trust as may be neces-
sary for testator's widow's support, health, 
and maintenance, trustee had to pay widow 
support, health, and maintenance for period 
of her natural life irrespective of her indi-
vidual income, but only for essential items. 
11. Wills <®=>687(1) 
Whether undistributed trust income 
belongs to estate of life beneficiary or re-
maindermen depends upon intention of tes-
tator as manifested in will or other trust 
instrument. 
12. Wills <^687(1) 
\ i-»r -iviith of ::fe beneficiarv under 
testamentary trust, remaindermen, as op-
posed to estate of life beneficiary, would be 
entitled to undistributed trust income, 
where trust did not state that undistributed 
income should be paid to beneficiary's es-
tate, but provided specific direction for sale 
of all real estate and personal property 
owned by trust estate and remaining upon 
beneficiary's death, and will explicitly stat-
ed testator's intent to exclude everyone not 
designated as trust beneficiary. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. The construction of a written in-
strument is a question of law, and the 
instrument may be construed and its legal 
effect determined by an appellate court. 
2. Whether an instrument is ambigu-
ous is a matter of law to be decided by the 
court. As a general rule, if the language 
of a written instrument is clear and can be 
carried out as written, there is no room for 
rules of construction. 
3. The primary function of a court in 
the interpretation of a will is to ascertain 
the testator's intent as derived from the 
four corners of the will. Where an ambi-
guity exists in the written instrument, par-
ol evidence is admissible to ascertain the 
meaning of the words used. 
4. Under the facts of this case, the 
testator's intent can be ascertained solely 
from the language of the testamentary 
trust. A trust provision which directs the 
trustee to pay the net income of the trust 
to a named beneficiary as is necessary for 
her support, health, and maintenance is not 
ambiguous. The trustee shall pay the ben-
eficiary's necessary expenses without con-
sideration of the beneficiary's independent 
income. 
5. The income of a trust for support 
and maintenance shall accumulate in the 
trust during the beneficiary's lifetime to 
assure adequate resources for lifetime 
maintenance. Upon the beneficiary's 
death, however, the unused income shall be 
added to the trust principal and distributed 
to the remaindermen. 
6. Under the provisions of Chapter 59 
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, proper 
venue for construction of a testamentary 
trust is in the county where the will creat-
ing the trust is filed for probate. 
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Paul A. Wolf of Brollier, Wolf & Schroe-
der, Hugoton, argued the cause, and Kim 
R. Schroeder of the same firm, was with 
him on the brief, for appellants. 
Stanley E. Antrim of Yoxall, Antrim & 
Yoxall, Liberal, argued the cause and was 
on the brief, for appellees. 
HERD, Judge: 
This case pertains to the construction of 
a testamentary trust established by the 
decedent Jim Chandley. Chandley died ::. 
1986. His will was probated and adminis-
tered in Stevens County District Court. J. 
Richard Godfrey was appointed acting 
trustee in accordance with the terms of the 
testamentary trust established by Chand-
ley's will. 
Chandley devised substantially all of his 
property to his wife, Peggy Chandley. Un-
der the terms of a testamentary trust, he 
created a life estate for the benefit of 
Peggy with the remainder to pass to named 
heirs. The trust provision in dispute pro-
vides that the net income of the trust shall 
be paid to Peggy "as may be necessary for 
her support, health and maintenance." 
Peggy Chandley resides in a nursing 
home in Dallas, Texas. She was declared 
incompetent by a Dallas County probate 
court, whereupon Sue Ann Walker Moran 
was appointed guardian for Peggy and her 
estate. 
Peggy claims she is the beneficial owner 
of the trust income and is entitled to all of 
the net income necessary for her support, 
health, and maintenance. In addition, she 
asserts any income not distributed for her 
support, health, and maintenance should be 
held by the trustee for future use should 
the need arise. Finally, Peggy claims any 
undistributed income should be paid to her 
estate upon death. 
The remaining defendants are benefi-
ciaries under the decedent's trust, subject 
to the interests of Peggy. They contend 
Peggy is entitled only to trust income for 
support, health, and maintenance expenses 
which she cannot pay from her own sepa-
rate income. Upon Peggy's death, the re-
maindermen claim all undistributed income 
should be paid into the trust corpus and 
distributed to them. 
J. Richard Godfrey, the trustee, filed this 
declaratory judgment action in Seward 
County District Court seeking an interpre-
tation and construction of the testamentary 
trust. A hearing was held in Seward Coun-
ty District Court on May 11, 1990, wherein 
the district court judge declined to rule on 
the admissibility of parol evidence but ac-
cepted a proffer of testimony. This prof-
fp>* 'Mk-ateri that Jim and Peggy Chandley 
disliked each other's relatives and, there-
fore, evenly divided their marital assets. 
The proffered evidence showed that Jim 
Chandley intended for the trust income to 
be utilized for Peggy's benefit only when 
her expenses exceeded the ability to pay 
from her own income. A proffer of evi-
dence on Peggy's behalf denied the assert-
ed intention of Jim Chandley. 
On August 3, 1990, the district court 
ruled the trust provisions were unambig-
uous and the proffered testimony inadmis-
sible. The court determined Peggy's in-
come from the marital estate must first be 
applied to her cost of living, and only if the 
income became insufficient to pay the rea-
sonable costs of support, health, and main-
tenance should the trust income be applied 
to these expenses. Peggy appeals. 
I 
The first issue we consider is whether 
Peggy Chandley, the life tenant under the 
provisions of Jim Chandley's testamentary 
trust, is entitled to all or a portion of the 
trust income for her support, health, and 
maintenance without regard to her person-
al income. 
[1-3] The construction of a written in-
strument is a question of law, and the 
instrument may be construed and its legal 
effect determined by an appellate court. 
Kennedy & Mitchell, Inc. v. Anadarko 
Prod. Co., 243 Kan. 130, 133, 754 P.2d 803 
(1988). Whether an instrument is ambigu-
ous is a matter of law to be decided by the 
court. Mobile Acres, Inc. v. Kurata, 211 
Kan. 833, 839, 508 P.2d 889 (1973). As a 
general rule, if the language of a written 
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instrument is clear and can be carried out 
as written, there is no room for rules of 
construction. In re Living Trust of Huxt-
able, 243 Kan. 531, 534, 757 P.2d 1262 
(1988). 
[4,5] The primary function of a court in 
the interpretation of a will is to ascertain 
the testator's intent as derived from the 
four corners of the will. Drack v. Ely, 237 
Kan. 654, 656, 703 P.2d 746 (1985). Where 
an ambiguity exists in the written instru-
ment, parol evidence is admissible to ascer-
tain the meaning of the words used. In re 
Living Trust ofHuxtable, 243 Kan. at 533, 
757 P.2d 1262. 
Let us now turn to the trust provisions 
at issue. Paragraph VI of Jim Chandley's 
will provides: 
"I give, devise, and bequeath the rest 
and residue of my estate at the time of 
final settlement to J. RICHARD GOD-
FREY AND HIS SUCCESSORS, in trust 
and upon trust, without bond or other 
security of any kind, to hold and adminis-
ter the same for the following uses and 
upon the following terms and conditions, 
without order or authority from any 
Court or person. 
"A. The trust estate shall be primari-
ly held and administered for the benefit 
of my wife, PEGGY CHANDLEY, for 
and during her natural life, with remain-
der to be converted into cash and the net 
proceeds divided as hereinafter provided. 
"B. The main purpose of the trust is 
to provide for the support, health and 
maintenance of my wife, PEGGY 
CHANDLEY, during her lifetime. The 
trust estate shall pay, monthly or at such 
intervals as may be agreed upon by the 
Trustee and my Wife, during the period 
of the trust such portion of the net in-
come from the trust as may be necessary 
for her support, health, and maintenance. 
There shall be no invasion of principal." 
Peggy urges a broad and liberal con-
struction of the trust provisions so that the 
trustee must pay to Peggy the sums need-
ed or desired by her for support, health, 
and maintenance. She also contends undis-
tributed trust income should be retained by 
the trustee to provide for subsequent sup-
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port and any remaining income upon her 
death shall be paid to her estate. 
The remaindermen assert the words "pri-
marily" and "necessary" are words of limi-
tation which indicate that Jim Chandley 
intended the trust to pay only those ex-
penses which exceeded Peggy's personal 
income. The remaindermen argue that, 
where Peggy's income is available and suf-
ficient to pay her living costs, the expenses 
are not necessary and, therefore, should 
not be paid from the trust income. 
[6-8] Whether a trustee can consider 
the personal income of a trust beneficiary 
is to be determined from the language of 
the instrument and surrounding circum-
stances. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 
§ 811, p. 229 (rev. 2d ed. 1981). Where the 
trust settlor manifests an intention that the 
trust property be applied to the benefi-
ciary's support only if and to the extent the 
beneficiary is in actual need, then the bene-
ficiary is not entitled to support from the 
trust fund if other sufficient resources are 
available.* See Dunklee v. Kettering, 123 
Colo. 43, 46, 225 P.2d 853 (1950); First 
National Bank of Catawba County v. 
Edens. 55 N.C.App. 697, 704, 286 S.E.2d 
818 (1982). See generally 2 Scott on Trusts 
§ 128.4 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1987). On the 
other hand, where a settlor directs the 
trustee to pay the beneficiary so much as is 
necessary for support and maintenance, an 
inference arises that the settlor intended 
the beneficiary to receive support from the 
trust estate, regardless of other income. 
See Taylor v. Hutchinson, 17 Ariz.App. 
301, 304-05, 497 P.2d 527 (1972); Estate of 
Wells v. Sanford, Trustee, 281 Ark. 242, 
246-47, 663 S.W.2d 174 (1984); Hamilton 
Nat Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga. 427, 428, 
211 S.E.2d 723 '1975); In re Coats Trust. 
581 S.W.2d 392. 393-96 (MoApp.1979); see 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, com-
ment e (1957). 
In Blair v. Blair, 82 Kan. 464, 108 Pac. 
827 (1910), the testator directed his execu-
tors to pay to his wife, out of the net 
proceeds of his business and estate earn-
ings, such amounts necessary for her sup-
port and maintenance, and any excess earn-
ings were to be reinvested in the estate. 
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The widow claimed she was entitled to all 
the net income to use without restraint 
This court determined the words "support 
and maintenance" were used in a broad and 
liberal manner. The court examined the 
language of the will and found the testator 
intended for his wife to have all the income, 
if necessary, for her support and mainte-
nance but did not provide her with a means 
to engage in any enterprise or business. 
82 Kan. at 467. 108 Pac. 827. 
The testator in Dunklee v. Kettering, 
123 Colo, at 44, 225 P.2d 853, directed the 
trustee to pay the entire trust income to 
her husband and authorized the trustee to 
use the principal and or income "as may be 
necessary to provide him with the necessi-
ties of life." The court considered evidence 
which showed that the husband possessed 
a large income from his practice of medi-
cine and ownership of a medical clinic. 123 
Colo, at 45, 225 P.2d 853. The Colorado 
court then determined that the phrase 
"necessities of life" was limited by the 
term "as may be necessary" and found 
that in light of the beneficiary's financial 
situation it was not necessary for the trust-
ee to provide for the beneficiary's necessi-
ties of life from the trust corpus. 123 
Colo, at 46, 225 P.2d 853. 
In First National Bank of Catawba 
County v, Edens, 55 N.CApp. 697, 286 
S.E.2d 818, an incompetent son was the 
beneficiary of his mother's testamentary 
trust. The beneficiary had already re-
ceived a share of his father's estate, and, 
under the provisions of the beneficiary's 
mother's trust, the trustee was to use the 
income and principal, in his discretion, as 
necessary for the support, maintenance, 
and comfort of the beneficiary. The trust 
specifically directed the trustee to consider 
the beneficiary's needs and the amount of 
income received from the father's estate. 
55 N.CApp. at 698, 286 S.E.2d 818. The 
North Carolina court found no error in the 
trustee's consideration of the beneficiary's 
personal income because the trust directed 
the trustee to pay in the trustee's discre-
tion, even if the beneficiary's personal in-
come was insufficient to cover his living 
expenses. 55 N.CApp. at 701-02, 286 
S.E.2d 818. 
In Estate of Wells v. Sanford, Trustee, 
281 Ark. 242, 663 S.WAI 174, a son be-
queathed his entire estate for the benefit of 
his incompetent mother. The trust direct-
ed the trustee to "expend for the support 
and maintenance of the [mother] such sums 
as may be necessary as long as she lives." 
The trust beneficiary owned 109 acres of 
realty and had a life interest in 80 acres; 
however, she also owed $23,749.74 to the 
nursing home where she resided. 281 Ark. 
at 244-45, 663 S.W.2d 174. A petition was 
filed to sell the trust assets to provide for 
the beneficiary's support, but the petition 
was denied by the trial court, which found 
the beneficiary must first apply her own 
income to her support. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court studied the language of the 
trust instrument and determined the words 
"necessary for support" meant the trust 
was intended to be used to support the 
beneficiary, regardless of the beneficiary's 
own assets. 281 Ark. at 246-47, 663 
S.W.2d 174. 
The same conclusion was reached in 
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Childers, 233 Ga. 
427, 211 S.E.2d 723, wherein the testator 
directed the trustee to pay, at his discre-
tion, the trust proceeds to his wife neces-
sary for her to maintain the same standard 
of living to which she was accustomed. 
The Georgia court found it is ordinarily 
presumed the testator intended the benefi-
ciary to be supported by the trust fund so 
that the beneficiary's other income and as-
sets were not to be considered. Thus, the 
trustee's discretionary power did not in-
clude authorization to consider the benefi-
ciary's private income. 233 Ga. at 428, 211 
S.E.2d 723. 
In the present case, we examine the lan-
guage of the testamentary trust to ascer-
tain Jim Chandley's intent in establishing 
the trust. Subsection A of paragraph VI 
states that the trust estate shall be primari-
ly held and administered for the benefit of 
Peggy Chandley, for life, with the remain-
der divided among named remaindermen. 
Subsection B states the purpose of the 
trust is to provide for the support, health, 
and maintenance of Peggy Chandley dur-
ing her lifetime. The trust provision then 
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directs that the trustee shall pay such por-
tion of the net income from the trust as 
may be necessary for Peggy's support, 
health, and maintenance. 
In Schaufv. Thomas, 209 Kan. 592, 498 
P.2d 256 (1972), the beneficiary of a testa-
mentary trust for support and maintenance 
brought an action to recover accumulated 
income in a trust. The trust directed the 
trustee to use as much of the principal of 
the estate as may be necessary to provide 
for the care, maintenance, and support of 
the plaintiff. For a time, all the trust 
income was paid into plaintiffs account; 
however, after a while the trustee paid 
most of the trust income into the trust 
account. The trial court found the will was 
not ambiguous and, therefore, parol evi-
dence was not necessary. The trial court 
ruled the testatrix intended the trustee to 
disburse to the plaintiff the income and 
principal necessary to provide the plaintiff 
with the comforts available when the trust 
was created, and found the trustee could 
consider funds available to the plaintiff 
from other sources. 209 Kan. at 597, 498 
P.2d 256. 
Upon review, this court ruled that extrin-
sic evidence which showed the testatrix's 
situation when the will was executed, the 
nature of the business, the extent of the 
property, and the relationship with the ben-
eficiaries was admissible to clarify the lan-
guage of the will, but not to change the 
will. 209 Kan. at 599, 498 P.2d 256. The 
court then considered evidence surrounding 
the establishment of the trust estate and 
found the testatrix intended to treat all 
daughters equally, with the remainder in-
terest in certain land to be used for the 
plaintiffs benefit. 209 Kan. at 600, 498 
P.2d 256. By placing itself as nearly as 
possible in the situation of the testatrix 
when :>ne executed the will, tins court de-
termined the testatrix intended the plaintiff 
to be entitled to all the trust income and as 
much of the principal as necessary for her 
support, health, and maintenance. 209 
Kan. at 603, 498 P.2d 256. 
The trial court in the present case stated 
the will was unambiguous and then con-
strued the testamentary trust provision to 
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give effect to the testator's intent by rely-
ing upon proffered testimony that Jim and 
Peggy divided their marital assets to pre 
vent each other's relatives from benefiting. 
In reaching the conclusion that Peggy's 
personal income must be depleted before 
the trust income could be paid for her 
support, health, and maintenance costs, the 
district court stated: "To achieve the aim 
of the parties manifested by earlier division 
of the marital estate in presumably equal 
shares and to assure support for both mari-
tal partners I find the disputed language to 
require payment from the trust for neces-
sary support." Thus, the trial court con-
sidered some of the proffered testimony to 
ascertain the testator's intent 
[9,10] Jim Chandley's intent can be 
ascertained solely from the language of the 
instrument It is unambiguous, as the trial 
court determined. Therefore, the trial 
court should not have used the proffered 
evidence in construing the trust provisions. 
We hold the trustee shall pay Peggy sup-
port, health, and maintenance for the peri-
od of her natural life irrespective of her 
individual income. The testator obviously 
intended to provide maintenance for his 
wife for her life. His provision is limited 
only by what is necessary. In other words, 
it cannot be used to provide nonessential 
items. 
[11] Now let us consider the disposition 
of the undistributed income. Whether it 
belongs to the estate of the life beneficiary 
or to the remaindermen depends upon the 
intention of the testator as manifested in 
the will or other trust instrument 51 Am. 
Jur.2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen 
§ 108. 
In Calkin v. Wallace, 160 Kan. 760, 165 
P.2d 224 (1946), this court considered 
whether a trust beneficiary's estate or the 
surviving trust beneficiaries were entitled 
to payment of undistributed trust income. 
We found the trust was created for the 
sole benefit of the named beneficiaries dur-
ing their natural lives and did not state any 
portion of the income should be paid to the 
beneficiary's estate. The court concluded 
the testator did not intend for the income 
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to be paid to the beneficiary s estate. 160 
Kan. at 765, 165 P.2d 224. 
[12] We reach a similar conclusion in 
this case. The trust does not state the 
undistributed income should be paid to Peg-
gy's estate, but provides specific direction 
for the sale of all real estate and personal 
property owned by the trust estate and 
remaining upon Peggy's death. In addi-
tion, the will explicitly states the testator's 
intent to exclude everyone not designated 
as a trust beneficiary Therefore, allowing 
the trust income to pass to Peggy's estate 
would violate the intention of Jim's will. 
Thus, we reject Peggy's claim for such a 
construction of Jim's trust and will, but 
hold that the unused trust income shall be 
accumulated in the trust during Peggy's 
lifetime to assure adequate resources for 
her lifetime maintenance. At her death, 
the unused income shall be added to the 
trust principal and distributed to the re-
maindermen. 
II 
[13] Peggy next contends Seward 
County District Court was an improper 
venue for an action to interpret the testa-
mentary trust. She asserts venue was 
proper in Stevens County District Court, 
where the will was probated and the trust-
ee appointed. For support, she relies upon 
K.S.A. 59-1601, which requires a testamen-
tary trustee to file an inventory and make 
accountings of trust property in the district 
court where the will was admitted to pro-
bate. 
Peggy concedes Stevens and Seward 
Counties are in the same judicial district 
with the same district judges. She con-
tends the trustee filed this action in Seward 
County for his own convenience and with-
out concern for the beneficiaries. Finally, 
Peggy alleges it is a violation of the pro-
bate code to allow the trustee to choose the 
venue for this type of action. 
K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-605 provides: "An 
action against a nonresident of this state 
. . . other than an action for which venue is 
otherwise specifically prescribed by law, 
may be brought in the county in which: (1) 
The plaintiff resides " 
in this ease Peggy is a resident of Dal-
las, Texas, and the trustee is a resident of 
Seward County, Kansas. Thus, the trustee 
determined K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-605 ap-
plied and filed this action in Seward Coun-
ty. The district court ruled venue was in 
Seward County. We disagree. Chapter 59 
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated estab-
lishes the venue of the proceeding to pro-
bate a will creating a testamentary trust 
and where the accountings shall be filed. 
We hold that the venue for actions to con-
strue such a trust is m the county where 
the will is filed for probate. We order that 
this case be transferred to Stevens County 
District Court and that an order be entered 
therein in this case consistent with this 
opinion. 
The judgment of the district court is 
reversed and this case is remanded for 
further proceedings. 
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